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ABSTRACT  
Title: Influential Factors within MNC’s: from an extended Agency perspective - A case 
study of the relationship between DNB’s subsidiary in Poland and the Headquarters 
 
Seminar date: 26 May 2015 
 
Course: FEKN90 
 
Authors: Sara Ahlberg & Astrid Lindesvärd  
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Magnus Johansson  
 
Five key words: Headquarters (HQ), Subsidiary, Relationship, goal alignment, Multi 
National Corporates (MNCs) 
 
Purpose: The aim of this thesis is to give further understanding of the relationship between 
subsidiaries and HQ by applying it to the broader agency theory perspective. By providing 
empirical material from a case study, the purpose is to further enrich and complement the 
agency theory applied to the context of subsidiary and HQ relationship.  
Methodology: This study is a qualitative case study of the relationship between subsidiary 
and headquarters with elements of both an inductive and deductive approach. Semi-structured 
interviews with representatives from DNB’s three ventures in Warsaw, Oslo and Stockholm 
were conducted. A theoretical framework was developed and revised by the empirical 
findings.  
Theoretical perspectives: In studying the relationship between subsidiary-HQ from an 
agency perspective this thesis follows the narrow and broad perspective of agency theory, 
applied to the relationship of subsidiary-HQ within an MNC. Most importantly it takes the 
literature a step further as it introduces an extended agency perspective on the relationship, 
consisting of three extensive variables that have never before been added to this context. 
Empirical foundation: The empirical data consists of 25 semi-structured interviews with 
employees from DNB HQ in Oslo, branch DNB Stockholm and subsidiary DNB Poland.  
Influential Factors within MNCs	   	   Ahlberg & Lindesvärd	  
	   3	  
Conclusions: The result from this case study is a revised theoretical framework that indicates 
that an extended perspective of the agency theory is applicable when studying the relationship 
between subsidiary-HQ. Three additional factors were found to affect the relationship – trust, 
attention and path dependency. Traditional agency theory measure goal congruence, 
additionally this thesis argues that goal achievement and goal commitment should be added 
when studying the relationship between subsidiary-HQ.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on the area of Multinational Corporations within the area of business 
studies and in particular it looks closer at the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries. In studying this relationship from an agency perspective the thesis follows earlier 
research in this area, but importantly it takes the literature a step further as it introduces three 
new variables that have never before been added to this context. This introductory chapter 
presents a theoretical as well as an empirical problematization of the area of interest of this 
study. With this background the research question is formulated and the purpose of the thesis 
is stated. 
1.1 THEORETICAL PROBLEMATIZATION 
This section looks closer at the relation between headquarters (HQ) and subsidiaries within 
the area of Multinational Corporations, (MNCs). Previous literature has shown that it is 
beneficial to study this relation within the agency framework and this section introduces the 
'traditional' agency framework as well as the more recent so called 'broader agency' 
framework. Finally the section points to a potential gap in this literature when studying the 
relationship between the HQ and subsidiaries, which will be the point of departure for the 
empirical study in this thesis. 
 
1.1.1	  HEADQUARTER	  AND	  SUBSIDIARY	  
The focus of this study is the intraorganizational relationship between the headquarter (HQ) 
of an organization and its subsidiary. This relationship has inspired a lot of research within the 
social sciences in recent decades, especially within the international business segment, as 
summarized by Tasoluk, Yaprak and Calantone (2006). One reason may be as Hoenen and 
Kostova (2015:104) puts it:  
 
The nature of global business today increases the complexity of multinational companies 
and highlights the challenges of managing headquarters–subsidiary (HQ–Sub) 
relationships. 
 
Yu, Subramaniam and Cannella (2009) argue that subsidiaries often fail to act as expected by 
the HQ and subsequently fail to act in the best interest of the firm. Ghoshal and Bartlett 
(1989) claim that this is due to the complexity of these organizations, as well as to the 
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transnational condition which involves a natural conflict scene because of cultural and 
environmental differences. According to Hoenen and Kostova (2015) this problem is 
aggravated by two different developments within MNCs that has occurred in recent times. 
First of all there has been a conversion of the firms’ international operations into highly 
complex organizational models, which gives the subsidiary more autonomy and discretion, 
and paradoxically also more centralized control and coordination from the HQ. For an MNC 
to succeed despite of these developments an alignment of the HQ's and the subsidiaries’ 
interests, goals, and capabilities is essential, according to Hoenen and Kostova. Secondly, 
Hoenen and Kostova suggest that there has been an increase of companies that expand into 
developing and emerging markets in the strive for growth and success. Attempts to leverage 
local talent as well as relocating advanced and sophisticated activities like R&D has 
increasingly become popular, as opposed to simply expanding in volume. 
 
Opposite to an argument made by many scholars that the importance of local contexts have 
declined due to globalization, Meyer, Mudambi, and Narula (2011) suggest that differences in 
local cultures and markets will continue to be visible and relevant within the area of MNCs. 
They point out that MNCs actually seem to experience even bigger challenges in coping with 
the complexity of their cross-national interactions as the globalization continues. These 
increased challenges Meyer et al. argue, are due to the fact that the MNC needs to handle 
what the authors call the ‘multiple embeddedness’ of handling both external contexts of the 
host country, as well as internal integration to the MNCs overall structure. The authors 
suggest that there is a trade-off in the situation of multiple embeddedness since it can create 
both business opportunities as well as operational challenges.  
 
Yu et al. (2009) summarize the problem of the relation between the HQ and the subsidiary 
simply by noting that tensions can emerge because of the geographic dispersion and 
differences across borders, and that a number of various factors can either enable or constrain 
the ability for the HQ to coordinate its subsidiary’s actions.  
 
1.1.2	  AGENCY	  THEORY	  
Agency theory has been widely applied within many disciplines since it is applicable to many 
contexts, not only to the relations that exist within or between organizations (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Several researchers within business suggest that in the process of trying to understand 
the relational interactions between a MNC’s HQ and its subsidiaries, the application of 
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agency theory is beneficial (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Tasoluk et al., 2006; Bergen, Dutta & 
Walker, 1992). Bergen et al. (1992) argue that agency theory constitute the proper lens 
through which international business operations should be studied because of the existing 
information asymmetry between the HQ and the subsidiary. Hoenen and Kostova (2015:105) 
claim that the use of agency theory when analyzing the relationships between HQ and 
subsidiaries is essential because of three reasons:  
 
(a) headquarters (principals) delegate decision-making authority to subsidiaries 
(agents); (b) headquarters are unable to fully observe whether the subsidiary properly 
exercises the delegated authority; and (c) the two parties often have divergent 
motivations resulting in subsidiaries not behaving in the corporate best interest.  
 
As noted by Hoenen and Kostova (2015) there are several 'streams' within agency theory. The 
traditional agency theory is mostly about hard variables, mainly studying the contracts, how 
to control the subsidiary through economic incentives and monitoring. Agency theory has 
mostly been about the hard variables and several researchers have criticized this, such as 
Hoenen and Kostova (2015) who underline that social and contextual factors need to be taken 
into consideration as well, as the relationship includes diverse units that are embedded in its 
specific context. Furthermore, more recent research has broadened the agency perspective 
when applying variables such as trust and path dependency, and recent developments of 
research within the MNC area has pointed to attention as an important factor for the success 
of the relationship between subsidiary and HQ within the MNC. 
A gap has been identified in this previous research in the understanding of Subsidiary and HQ 
relationships as these additional ‘softer’ factors (trust, attention and path dependency), needs 
to be taken into consideration in this specific relationship, as a complement to the agency 
theory. The theory section of this thesis discusses them from the agency perspective on MNCs 
and argues that they are an important contribution to the broader agency perspective. 
 
1.2 EMPIRICAL PROBLEMATIZATION 
DNB is Norway’s largest bank and holds a home market leader position (Norges Bank, 2014). 
DNB was established in Poland by a joint venture in 2006 (DNB NOR Annual Report, 2006) 
and the Polish firm is a legally independent subsidiary (DNB Annual Report, 2014). DNB had 
a turbulent historic development in Poland with several reorganizations, strategic changes and 
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changes of the entire banking profile. Today the Polish operations are solely focusing on 
corporate banking. As a result of these developments, the Polish subsidiary has experienced 
large employee layoffs, and it has a portfolio that partly lies outside the DNB corporate 
strategy. Since 2010 the Polish operations are fully owned by the DNB group and the 
alignment of the Polish operations with the rest of the group is in progress.  
 
As mentioned above, managing the subsidiary-HQ relationship is challenging because of its 
cross-border condition and natural conflict scene. The relationship between the Polish 
subsidiary in Warsaw (Poland), and the DNB group HQ in Oslo (Norway), constitutes a good 
empirical example of the cross-border condition between subsidiaries and HQ’s, and it 
represents the empirical contribution in this study. The branch in Stockholm (Sweden) is 
taken into consideration as well and it is a part of the empirical contribution, since some 
authority over Poland is transferred to Stockholm. From the agency perspective the subsidiary 
in Poland represent the agent, whereas the units in Stockholm and Oslo represent principals.  
 
When trying to leverage the market-leading position that DNB holds in Norway into its Polish 
operations, a well functioning relationship is essential. As suggested by Hoenen and Kostova 
(2015), in order to succeed despite working across borders, the firm, in this case DNB, needs 
to align the subsidiaries’ interests, goals, and capabilities with the HQ’s. Today DNB is in the 
middle of this process and DNB’s operations in Poland face many of the challenges that are 
described in the theoretical problematization. For instance, DNB Poland operates in a 
completely different context on the financial market, where high competition and a dispersed 
ownership structure is the reality, whereas DNB in Norway holds the position of market 
leader within a highly consolidated market structure (Finanstilsynet, 2014; PFSA, 2014). The 
dispersed contexts the units operate in makes the relationship particularly interesting to study 
and analyze. 
 
The empirical material in this study is predominantly based on the subsidiary’s perspective, 
since the majority of the interviews took place in Poland. Because of this, the relationship is 
put forth as “subsidiary-HQ” throughout the paper instead of the contrary; HQ-subsidiary. 
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Based on this background the research question is as follows;  
 
What factors affect the relationship between a subsidiary and headquarter, when trying to 
align the subsidiary with the headquarters’ goals?  
 
1.4 PURPOSE 
The aim of this thesis is to give a further understanding of the relationship between 
subsidiaries and HQ through a broader agency theory perspective. By providing empirical 
material from a case study, the purpose is to further enrich and complement the agency theory 
applied to the context of subsidiary and HQ relationship.  
 
1.5 DELIMITATIONS 
Agency theory is applicable in many contexts, but the focus of this thesis focuses on the 
subsidiary-HQ relationship. Furthermore, agency theory covers many aspects and due to time 
limits it is not possible to cover them all. Aligning the agent through the right composition of 
economic or ‘hard’ incentives constitutes a large part of agency theory. This aspect has been 
consciously disregarded in benefit for social, or ‘soft’ incentives and implications, such as 
environment, trust and attention. As a lot of focus is placed on these social and psychological 
incentives, the thesis might be argued to ignore the full potential of the agency theory. There 
are delimitations when performing the empirical research as well. The context is limited to 
one bank, DNB. To broaden the perspective, multiple units within this context are analyzed, 
to get various perspectives upon the relationship in focus. Performing a multiple case study on 
several banks would further benefit the research, but again, due to the time limit this was not 
possible. Suggestions for further research within certain areas of interest that have been 
noticed throughout the writing of this thesis is presented in the discussion below.  
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2 THEORETICAL REVIEW 
This chapter begins by an introduction to agency theory and goes on to discuss the application 
of this theoretical framework to the relationship between subsidiaries and their HQ’s. The 
chapter highlights factors that earlier research has identified as important when applying the 
agency theory to the subsidiary-HQ relationship. First of all it looks closer at three factors that 
the traditional agency theory denotes as important, which are information asymmetry, risk and 
control. Secondly the chapter discusses the additional factors that are proposed by Hoenen 
and Kostova (2015) to be important extensions of the agency theory within the MNC context. 
These are presented as ‘organizational culture’ in this thesis. Finally three factors that have 
been brought to attention by the literature on MNCs and agency theory separately will be 
discussed in the context of agency theory within the context of subsidiary-HQ relationship 
and argued to be potentially important complements to the broader framework, proposed by 
Hoenen and Kostova (2015). These factors are path dependency, trust and attention. The 
chapter concludes by presenting a theoretical framework that includes all the factors presented 
in the chapter that may affect the subsidiary-HQ relationship. This is the framework that will 
eventually be applied to the case study on DNB. 
 
2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
 
2.1.1	  APPLICABILITY	  
Ross (1973:134) argues that “examples of agency theory are universal”, by which he implies 
that agency theory is applicable in many different situations. Eisenhardt (1989) claims that 
agency theory can be most useful in examining organizational structures, and specifically 
when looking at the relationship between two actors in an organization; the owner (principal) 
and the manager/employee (agent). Several researchers promote the use of agency theory for 
the purpose of investigating the relationship between headquarters and subsidiary (Tasoluk, et 
al., 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989). The agency perspective on the 
relationship between headquarter and subsidiary is particularly interesting because of the 
asymmetry of information that exist between different locations, because of the focus on 
relatively different goals on for instance performance, and also because of self interest on the 
part of the HQ in that it cares more about the global achievements all together in the 
organization than local ones (Tasoluk et al., 2006). 
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In this paper, the principal-agent formulation as proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is 
employed. In this thesis the HQ represents the principal which has delegated authority and 
decision-making rights to the agent, the subsidiary. The subsidiary in turn is performing 
services on behalf of the HQ. 
 
2.1.2	  BACKGROUND	  AND	  DEFINITION	  
In their influential paper on agency theory, or “the theory of agency relationships”, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) defines the relationship as a contract between people where one or several 
persons (the principals) hires or engages another person (the agent) and gives authority to the 
agent to perform a service on behalf of the principal. Arguably both of the parties within the 
relationship are utility maximizers, which implies that the individuals rationally choose 
alternatives that maximize their own utility. Because the principal and the agent may have 
different objectives or preferences, the agent will not always act in the principal’s best interest 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Cuevas-Rodriguez et al., 2012). Tasoluk et al. (2006) describe this 
separation of interests as ‘goal incongruence’. The problem suggested by agency theory is 
how the principal can get the agent to align its work with the goals of the principal, that is, to 
achieve goal congruence. The usual instruments put forward by agency theory to achieve this 
are contracts and control mechanisms (Tasoluk et al., 2006). The costs associated with 
applying the instruments are called ‘agency costs’, which work against the principal in its aim 
towards profit maximization (Fontrodona & Sison, 2006). Fontrodona and Sison further assert 
that these costs also can include efforts pursued by the agent in demonstrating its 
commitments to the principal's goals. The focus of the theory is to minimize these agency 
costs through efficient alignment of the principal's and the agent's interests (Shankman, 1999). 
As stated by Bergen et al. (1992), there is an assumption that the principal within the 
relationship is the dominant party, and most models within agency theory are viewed from the 
principal’s perspective. This implies that the efficient contract is one where the utility is 
maximized for the principal, and not for both the principal and the agent. Baiman (1990), 
among other authors, underlines the fact that all agency models are based on the pessimistic 
assumptions that the agent acts in self-interest and that the agent is work-averse and risk-
averse. Miller and Sardais (2011) describe this relationship as one where agents are held to be 
opportunists and owners the responsible parties.  
 
Influential Factors within MNCs	   	   Ahlberg & Lindesvärd	  
	   15	  
The traditional agency theory highlights several important factors, or variables, that are 
important for the principal-agent relationship. In the following the most important of them 
will be presented and further discussed in the context of the subsidiary-HQ relationship. 
These variables are information asymmetry, risk and control. The choice of these agency 
variables is based on the argument made by Eisenhardt (1989) that the next step of the 
research within agency theory should focus on these variables as they make the most 
beneficial contribution to the organizational research. 
	  
2.1.3	  INFORMATION	  ASYMMETRY	  
That one individual to a party possesses more information than the other is usually referred to 
as asymmetry of information. In the particular case of the subsidiary-HQ relationship, the 
headquarter possesses less information about the national circumstances for instance than the 
subsidiary (Eisenhardt, 1989), and as such the agent possesses more information than the 
principal (Darrough & Stoughton, 1986). Arrow (1985) assimilates the term with hidden 
information. The HQ wishes for the information not to be hidden and to be able to observe 
that the subsidiary is exercising the delegated authority properly in order to reach goal 
congruence. This information asymmetry may become problematical for the subsidiary as 
well, as information valuable to the subsidiary is scattered across the organization, not least 
within HQ (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Tasoluk et al., 2006). Because of the lack of complete 
information Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the HQ is likely to be more risk averse in regards to 
the subsidiary's operations as there is risk of misaligned actions on behalf of the subsidiary, 
such as possible misrepresentation. Eisenhardt claims that the information asymmetry can be 
reduced through joint cooperative efforts. A long-term relationship, she argues, between the 
HQ and the subsidiary, makes it easier for the headquarter to co-align its incentives and also 
to get a more complete assessment of the performance of the agent. Shapiro (2005) argues 
that as relationships are sustained over time, principals and agents will learn about each other 
and develop the understanding.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989) argues that within agency theory information is treated as a commodity in 
that it can be paid for. Investments can be made in formal or informal information systems 
such as budgeting and managerial supervision and these systems can be used in order to 
control the problem of hidden information.  
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2.1.4	  RISK	  
Economists explored risk sharing in the 1960s and 1970s (Arrow, 1985) and later it was 
included within agency theory and added to the agency problem, in particular with regards to 
potentially diverging attitudes towards risk among cooperating parties (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). When it comes to risk-sharing within the MNC setting, the argument is made that it is 
the HQ that can or should take on more risk than the individual subsidiaries as it is better able 
to diversify the risk. However, risk-sharing can become a problem for the MNC to the extent 
that different actors in the agency relationship have different risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Moreover, agents, as utility maximizers, are argued to direct their efforts to maximize 
their own personal utility which may imply that they behave in a way that is beneficial for 
them but detrimental to the principal (Tricker, 2012). The subsidiary may, for example, have 
incentives to take on too much risk if it does not have to pay the consequences of a bad 
investment. Tricker (2012:61) further states: “after all, it is not their money they are risking”. 
Tan and Maloney (2006) have found that there are at least two reasons as to why managers 
would not align their activities to serve the goals of the HQ, and hence constitute a risk for the 
HQ. The first one is that there is a chance that there exists a misalignment in the economic 
incentives between the HQ and the manager or the CEO of the foreign subsidiary because of 
lack of motivation from the agent's side. He or she might focus the efforts on sub goals that do 
not fully benefit the economic interest of the foreign subsidiary. The second reason as to why 
the managers of the subsidiary would not fully promote the goals of the HQ is because these 
might not be the same as the subsidiary’s goals. This, called an ‘economic incentive problem’ 
by Tan and Maloney, is why the HQs of MNCs use expatriates to fill positions at the foreign 
subsidiary, even though a national person would be more suited for the role. Headquarters 
believe that the expatriate has lower incentives for pursuing activities in his or her own 
benefit since he or she is more used to working closely with HQ and in the same social area, 
and thus, the expatriate lowers the risk for the HQ. 
 
2.1.5	  CONTROL	  
Getting an MNC aligned to work towards the goals set by the owners of the organization – 
achieving goal congruence – is, according to Haberstroh (1965), a problem of ‘dysfunctional 
variation’. Haberstroh (1965) further asserts that the process of alignment as well as the 
maintenance of it cannot be taken for granted, but needs control. The question regarding what 
processes and behaviors that needs to be controlled is key, and the choice is to be made from 
the highest controlling body of the organization. The prevailing custom within business is to 
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aim for profit maximization by monitoring and control (Haberstroh, 1965). Haberstroh 
describes this as ‘egocentric economizing’. When it is impossible for the principal to observe 
the behavior of the agent, the principal has two options. Either he or she can invest in 
information systems, such as budgeting systems, reporting procedures, boards of directors, 
and additional layers of management. This is also called ‘direct’ or ‘behavioural control’ 
(Andersson, Björkman & Forsgren, 2005). The direct control can also be in the shape of 
centralized decision-making and through direct supervision by the headquarters 
representatives. The other option is for the principal to state ‘outcome-based contracts’. This 
control mechanism can evaluate the subsidiary's performance through financial performance 
measures, market share, productivity or knowledge development (Andersson et al., 2005).  
 
According to Andersson et al. (2005), the use of direct control from the corporate level might 
be hampering for the subsidiary since the decision-makers on the corporate level do not 
possess an understanding of the local business environment equivalent to the subsidiary 
employees. Andersson et al. further suggest that the use of corporate level expatriates can 
cause the local relationships of the subsidiary to become shallow. This is because the focus of 
the expatriates will be on activities that are easy to learn and understand during their limited 
placement. Anderson et al. also suggest that the subsidiary is likely to prioritize activities that 
produce relatively immediate profits as the subsidiary is evaluated on the basis of yearly 
profits. Ma (1999) and Yu et al. (2009) indicate that differences in key organizational 
characteristics between subsidiary and HQ can make it more difficult for the HQ to centrally 
monitor and control the subsidiary’s actions and alignment towards the HQ. The differences, 
they argue, will aggravate the effective communication and knowledge sharing between the 
units. 
 
What has been described above is the background to the traditional, or ‘narrow stream’, of 
agency theory, as well as three important factors derived from it (information asymmetry, risk 
and control). As stated in these paragraphs regarding the narrow agency perspective including 
the factors information asymmetry, risk and control, the aim is to achieve goal congruence 
between the agent and the principal – the subsidiary and the HQ in the case of this thesis. The 
following section will first provide a discussion of some of the critical perspectives on agency 
theory. Following this the two subsequent sections bring forward the contributions from 
Hoenen and Kostova’s (2015) ‘broader stream’ of agency theory referred to as organizational 
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culture in this thesis, with focus on the social and contextual environment embedding the 
different units of an MNC.  
 
2.2 PERSPECTIVES ON AGENCY THEORY 
Perrow (1986), criticizes agency theory and asserts that it “rarely tries to explain actual 
events”, suggesting that agency theory is inapplicable for empirically testing. Various critical 
views on agency theory exist, and many of these emphasize that the theoretical scope is too 
narrow (Tricker, 2012). Some researchers argue that a broader progression of the agency 
theory is particularly relevant to MNCs that have the need to handle the relationships between 
various subsidiaries and their HQ (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Kostova & Zaher, 1999; Meyer 
et al., 2011). Fontrodona and Sison (2006) suggest that the firm should not be referred to as 
merely a nexus of contractual relationships and that such a notion of the firm ignores the 
human person’s full social nature. Hirsch, Michaels & Fridman (1987) made an early 
contribution to this line of reasoning, arguing that theories that combine Economics and 
Sociology give a more realistic view of organizations, as opposed to pure economic theories. 
In accordance with Hirsch et al. Eisenhardt (1989) recommends that agency theory should be 
used with complementary theories. She further argues that agency theory ignores much of the 
complexity within organizations and that it only present a partial view of the world. As 
mentioned earlier, when describing the theoretical problem of the study, Hoenen and Kostova 
(2015:108) advocate the broader perspective of agency theory that both social and contextual 
factors in to consideration. More specifically they argue that the broader perspective:  
 
 […] allows the incorporation of key organizational realities such as multilayered 
structures, multiplicity of principals and agents, continuity and change in agency 
relations, and impact of the broader social context. 
 
Following the more recent and broader perspective on agency theory presented above, 
important factors within the broader theoretical framework that applies well to the context of 
the relationship between the subsidiary and the HQ are discussed in the next section.  
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2.3 ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE 
Meyer et al. (2011) argue that an extension of the traditional, or narrow, agency theory is 
specifically beneficial to the study of MNCs because of the complex social contexts they 
operate in and because of what they call ‘multiple embeddedness’. At the subsidiary level 
there is a need to balance the local identity, the ‘external embeddedness’, with the 
subsidiary’s strategic role within the MNC, the ‘internal embeddedness’. This multiple 
embeddedness, Meyer et al. argue, aggravates the complexity in managing the interaction 
between subsidiary and HQ in order to achieve the goals of the MNC. 
 
Several other authors argue that the cultural and environmental aspects of one host nation of 
the MNC not only affect the venture in that nation, but the whole MNC (Yu et al. 2009; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Ma, 2009). Altaf and Ali (2011) describe organizational culture as 
“the shared values, beliefs and norms in an organization”, and they emphasize that the 
stronger the implementation of the values and the control, the stronger this culture will be. In 
turn the staff will be more aligned to the goals of the MNC and a greater effectiveness in the 
organization overall is achieved, simplifying the goal achievement of the MNC. Altaf and Ali 
conclude that to achieve this strength of culture the organization needs to adapt to the external 
environment. Hofstede (1991) on the other hand, argue that there is a need for intermediaries, 
or ‘corporate diplomats’, as he calls them, who can work and perform within both cultures, 
and in that way make the multinational structures work. Hofstede argues that this is because a 
multinational corporation has to build links between both natural cultures that build on values, 
and business cultures that build on practices (Hofstede, 1991).  
 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) propose that there is another difficulty and additional cost for 
foreign subsidiaries that are culturally distant from their HQ, stemming from their 
unfamiliarity with the HQ's local embeddedness, such as its business procedures, information 
networks and political influences. Gulati, Nohria and Zaheer (2000) describe this 
characteristic as ‘liability of foreignness’. Because of the cultural distance, customers' 
preferences differ as well (Egelhoff, 1982). According to Egelhoff the consequence of unique 
local preferences is that more of the subsidiaries' focus needs to be on local responsiveness 
rather than global integration. The jeopardy in this lies in the subsidiary's potential incentives 
to initiate competitive actions to maximize their own gains instead of accomplishing the 
general strategy of the MNC. 
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Scholars emphasize that agency relationships are not static, but that they are performed within 
a social context and that external forces and changes in the social context will affect the 
relationship (Shapiro, 2005; Mitnick, 1992). Suggestions of forces that they put forward are 
competitors, regulators, interest groups, as well as other agency relationships. As the parties 
will develop a shared history and personal relationships, Granovetter (1985) proposes that the 
relationships get embedded, and that social networks are established. Lewis (2006) analyzes 
the problem of getting all employees aligned with an organizational change across borders. 
According to Lewis, motivation is closely interlinked with leadership and management, and 
the international manager who is unaware of different cultural behaviors will find it most 
difficult to motivate and cooperate with the foreign staff and managers.  
 
Implied in the factor of organizational culture including the broader agency perspective put 
forth by Hoenen and Kostova (2015) is that the aim of balancing the differing social and 
contextual embeddedness of the various ventures in an MNC, is to make goal achievement 
possible. 
 
2.4 ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO AGENCY THEORY
    
2.4.1	  PATH	  DEPENDENCY	  
Mitnick (1992:77), assert that many scholars abandon the premise of an “acontextual, 
ahistorical, and static relationship between principals and agent”. In the same direction, 
Nilakant and Rao (1994) emphasize that it is essential to understand the long-term 
implications of the agency theory performance outcome. In this thesis, an argument is made to 
add also the historical and longitudinal aspect of the agency theory brought forward by above 
scholars to the subsidiary-HQ relationship. Few scholars have touched upon the issue of 
historical implications within this specific setting (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015) and a deeper 
evaluation of the theoretical and empirical effects of this addition seems to be lacking. 
Researchers have previously handled the implications of the historical effect separately within 
MNC research and agency theory (Halinen & Törnroos, 1998; Holmstöm & Milgrom, 1987). 
For instance Halinen and Törnroos (1998) emphasize the temporal aspect within the analysis 
of business networks. They argue that companies are bound to their past, present and future, 
and that each unit has its own history, during which it has evolved. The temporal aspect seems 
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very relevant when it comes to the subsidiary-HQ relationship, as the agency relationship may 
change over time (Nilakant & Rao, 1994). Accordingly, an additional factor to be added to the 
subsidiary-HQ relationship from an agency perspective is proposed. This factor will from 
now on be called ‘path dependency’, and it is one of three contributions of this thesis. 
The firm cannot overlook its past, which makes it hard for the firm to fundamentally change 
its operations and routines. Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Shaefer (2013:390) describe this 
as being ‘path dependent’: “it depends on the path the firm has taken in the past to get where 
it is now”. Vergne and Durand (2010:736) also illustrate the construct of path dependency, but 
as ‘a mechanism that connects the past and the future in an abstract way’. They further assert, 
opposite to the wide description brought forward by Besanko et al., that a narrow view of the 
concept is to prefer, even though it has previously been used within organizational research to 
describe the general historical past, giving the definition less theoretical and empirical value. 
Their narrow version of the construct is defined as: “a property of a stochastic process which 
obtains under two conditions (contingency and self-reinforcement) and causes lock-in in the 
absence of exogenous shock”. When a lock-in occurs, Vergne and Durand explain, the process 
ends up in a situation that is hard to escape from. Equilibrium arises where endogenous 
change is unlikely to occur. They also describe that as a firm chooses paths continuously, a 
lock-in can happen even on the less optimal paths. Within the strategic management field, 
path dependency at the resource and capability level can both be used to describe a 
competitive advantage as inherited through persistent investment in resources and capabilities 
within the firm, and also as creating harmful lock-ins through inflexibility (Vergne & Durand, 
2010).  
 
2.4.2	  TRUST	  
The second addition this thesis proposes to an extension of agency theory is trust. Within 
recent management studies, authors have opposed the widely known agency theory with 
stressing the importance of building trust rather than trying to manipulate the setting with 
monitoring and incentives (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999). Granovetter (1985) refers to the agency 
theory as “under-socialized”, and due to the assumption of goal incongruence and difference 
in risk aversion, Perrow (1986) states that monitoring and incentives might actually increase 
the attitudinal differences between the principal and the agent. Beccerra and Gupta (1999) 
suggest it to be beneficial instead of opposing the literature against each other, to incorporate 
different theories on trust with the classical aspect of the agency theory. Becerra and Gupta 
(1999) argue that trust is the most important ingredient of social capital, and it is very 
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valuable together with the other ingredients of social capital: cooperation and collective 
action, but not in itself. Major findings were that basically all managers the authors asked 
about trust indicated that personal contact was essential to establish a high-trust relationship. 
Trust enhances the willingness to take on risk and that is why it is so important within a 
healthy organization. When trust exists, an individual becomes vulnerable to another, because 
it accepts some risk. This implies that only in situations where there is some likelihood that an 
individual is taken advantage of another within an interaction, that trust as a concept becomes 
relevant (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999). Especially, Kim and Mauborgne (1993) find trust 
important for foreign subsidiary managers to be engaged in the organization and be 
committed to its goals. It brings along desirable social effects such as individual and group 
performance, societal development and also process variables that relates to management, 
such as conflict, commitment and cooperation.  
 
Tasoluk et al. (2006) argue that due to the local conditions of the subsidiary, the achievement 
of the common goal might be hard to for the subsidiary to attain the same way as the HQ 
would like to. The major factor to these different perceptions is the lack of trust in each 
other’s capabilities, which, according to Tasoluk et al. (2006), seems to be the causal 
condition of means incongruence. Their definition of this type of incongruence is: “the extent 
to which there are differences in the means with which the principal and agent would like to 
achieve their congruent goal, given that goal congruence has been attained”. Tasoluk et al. 
(2006) suggest that in solving this problem, perceived competence level needs to be 
increased, and that HQ has two choices for doing this: i) either HQ chooses to increase the 
competence of the subsidiary by educating and providing resources for this purpose, or ii) it 
can try to increase the perception of itself regarding competence in the subsidiary’s 
perspective. The first alternative they propose, even though it might seem as a logical attempt 
from the side of the HQ, can actually worsen the situation by increasing the discrepancy even 
more. This is because the subsidiary did not observe any effort to change on behalf of the HQ. 
The conclusion is that HQ should go with the second alternative and that only when both 
parts’ conceptions of the counterpart’s expertise and competence change, trust can be gained. 
This, in turn, leads to functional collaboration (Tasoluk et al., 2006).  
 
2.4.3	  ATTENTION	  
Based on the arguments presented in this paragraph, the application of attention into the 
subsidiary-HQ context from an agency perspective is suggested in this thesis. Some scholars 
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have found that attention within an organization is the most critical and sought-after resource 
that the organization possess (Haas & Hansen, 2001). At the same time, Haas and Hansen 
argue, that it is the scarcest resource. This limitation of organizational attention they propose, 
can give raise to an internal market for the HQ’s attention. Within a modern MNC, it is 
argued that the allocation of the HQ’s attention towards its various and dispersed subsidiaries 
is a highly strategic implication, as the MNC tries to align the subsidiaries towards its general 
goal (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Birkinshaw, Bouquet & Ambos, 2007; Campbell, 1989). 
Ambos and Birkinshaw’s (2010) findings emphasize that for subsidiaries’ performance to 
increase, it is essential that they receive attention from HQ.  
 
Ambos and Birkinshaw (2010) argue that HQ’s attention towards the subsidiary’s initiatives, 
in interaction with subsidiary autonomy and inter-unit power will increase the subsidiary’s 
performance. Kostova and Zaher (1999) are on a similar track, but put it differently. They 
argue instead that legitimacy is a critical issue for MNCs and that more research on the issue 
is needed. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) mentioned that internal legitimacy, defined as “the 
acceptance and approval of an organizational unit by other units within the firm and, 
primarily, by the parent company” (Kostova & Zaher, 2010:72), is crucial for the survival of 
the subsidiary. This, Pfeffer and Salancik propose, is because the subsidiary is dependent on 
the HQ for sustaining access to vital resources such as capital and knowledge. Kostova and 
Zaher (2010) argue that if a subsidiary does not receive enough internal legitimacy, it can 
constrain its efforts to receive external legitimacy as well. External legitimacy is defined as 
acceptance and approval from the surrounding environment in the host country the subsidiary 
operate in (Kostova & Zaher, 2010). 
 
Implicitly stated above in the extended perspective of agency theory suggested by this thesis 
including path dependency, trust and attention, is that there are different implications and 
thereby differing aims for the different factors. Path dependency is proposed to affect the 
whole relationship between the subsidiary and HQ, and thereby affecting goal congruence, 
goal achievement as well as goal commitment. Attention is proposed to affect goal 
achievement in a positive manner, and trust is regarded to affect the goal commitment of the 
subsidiary as the subsidiary get more committed to the organization once trust is established. 
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2.4.4	  RELATIONSHIP	  MEASUREMENT	  	  
The theoretically derived factors presented above that are suggested to be affecting the 
relationship between subsidiary and HQ will be measured through goal congruence, goal 
achievement and goal commitment. Within the narrow agency perspective, goal congruence 
between the subsidiary and HQ is the objective, through an optimal design of the contract, 
which is the unit of analysis (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). The social view of agency theory, 
as mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, relaxes the premises of agency theory and 
considers social elements as well (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). 
These mechanisms would through corporate socialization lead to a reduction of the agency 
problem. Strange, Filatotchev, Buck and Wright (2009), point to a lack of capabilities or 
absorptive capacity that can increase the agency problem through lack of knowledge in how 
to achieve the goals set up by the HQ. This can be interpreted as an argument stating that the 
agent’s perspective is an important aspect as well, not only the principal’s. The agent needs 
resources to be able to achieve the goals of the MNC, why resources should be considered an 
important aspect of a successful relationship. The aim within the broader agency perspective 
is implicitly stated to be goal achievement in this case. The same goal is found to be the aim 
with increased attention that implies an increased spread of resources such as knowledge to 
the subsidiary, making it possible for the subsidiary to achieve the goals. Increased trust in the 
organization between the subsidiary and the HQ is suggested to make the goal commitment of 
the subsidiary stronger. The next section describes how some ‘smaller’ independent variables 
in the shape of communication, collaboration and integration affect the factors (information 
asymmetry, risk, control, organizational culture, path dependency, trust and attention) brought 
forward in this thesis.  
 
2.4.5	  RESOURCES	  AS	  INDEPENDENT	  VARIABLES	  
Smaller variables are proposed by this thesis to make a measurement possible of the factors’ 
effect on the subsidiary-HQ relationship. These smaller variables are suggested to be 
communication, collaboration and integration. A discussion follows on why these particular 
variables were chosen. 
 
Meyer et al. (2011:241) argue that a MNC creates value across countries by ’leveraging 
tangible and intangible resources’. They also suggest that one of the opportunities that the 
MNC has got, having units in dispersed places, is the spreading and the integration of 
knowledge and competence between the units. Knowledge and intangibles are proven to 
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account for a widely increasing share of the income of nations all over the world (Lev, 2001; 
Mudambi, 2008). By this, integration is interpreted as one of the independent variables 
affecting the factors. The second independent variable suggested is communication. Ghoshal 
and Bartlett (1988) established that communication between units in an organization 
facilitates knowledge flows within the MNC, and it is also argued that internal 
communication is strongly correlated with employee motivation (Minbaeva, Pedersen, 
Björkman, Fey & Park, 2014). The third independent variable is argued to be collaboration. 
Collaboration is the main emphasis in Tasoluk et al.´s (2006) research about HQ–subsidiary 
relationships. Tasoluk et al. argue that in meeting common challenges, a greater 
communication needs to be established between the two units, as well as they point out that 
collaboration is argued by some to be the key ingredient for success between global and local 
units. The three independent variables integration, communication and collaboration will be 
used in the analysis of the factors, as they are argued to indirectly affect the relationship of the 
subsidiary and HQ through the suggested factors. A prescriptive framework of the factors that 
are suggested to affect the relationship is featured below. 
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2.4.6	  THEORETICAL	  FRAMEWORK	  
A summary of the theoretical framework is introduced below in Table 1. The factors that are 
suggested to affect the subsidiary-HQ relationship in the theoretical review are presented on 
the left-hand side. A summary of the referenced academic papers on each topic, or factor, is 
presented on the right-hand side. 
 
 
Table 1, Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
 
Information*Asymmetry Eisenhardt+(1989),+Darrough+&Stoughton,+(1986),+Arrow+(1985),+Hoenen+&+Kostova+(2015),+Tasoluk+et+al.+(2006)
Risk Arrow+(1971),+Eisenhardt+(1989),+Jensen+&+Meckling+(1976),+Tricker+(2012),+Tan+&+Maloney+(2006)
Control Haberstroh+(1965),+Andersson+et+al.+(2005),+Ma+(1999),+Yu+et+al.+(2009)
Organizational*Culture
Meyer+et+al.+(2011),+Yu+et+al.+(2009),+Bartlett+&+Ghoshal+
(1989),+Hofstede+(1991),+Altaf+&+Ali+(2011),+Kostova+&+
Zaher+(1999),+Gulati+et+al.+(2000),+Egelhoff+(1982)
Path*Dependency
Mitnick+(1992),+Nilakant+&+Rao+(1994),+Hoenen+&+
Kostova+(2015),+Halinen+&+Törnroos+(1998),+Besanko+et+
al.+(2013),+Vergne+&+Durand+(2010),+Helfat+et+al.+(2007)
Trust Becerra+&+Gupta+(1999),+Kim+&+Mauborgne+(1993),+Granovetter+(1985),+Perrow+(1986),+Tasoluk+et+al.+(2006),+
Attention
Haas+&+Hansen+(2001),+Bouquet+&+Birkinshaw+(2008),+
Birkinshaw+et+al.+(2007),+Campbell+(1989),+Ambos+&+
Birkinshaw+(2010),+Kostova+&+Zaher+(1999),+Pfeffer+&+
Salancik+(1978)
Subsidiary*and*HQ*Relationship*affecting*factors+
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3 METHOD 
This chapter presents the unit of analysis of the study, the research method and the research 
design used. It also presents how the data has been collected, sorted and analyzed. 
 
3.1 SELECTION & UNIT OF ANALYSIS 
The primary unit of analysis is the relationship between subsidiary and HQ. This relationship 
will mainly be viewed from the Polish subsidiary's perspective throughout the study as the 
predominant part of the interviews was undertaken there. The perspectives of the Norwegian 
and the Swedish unit are also taken into account, although with less weight.  The interview 
context is the corporate banking divisions in DNB Oslo, Stockholm and Warsaw and the 
objects of the interviews are employees within these divisions. The majority of the employees 
is either top management, head of customer relations or industry division heads. Three 
respondents were analysts. In order to get as a complete and true picture that is possible of the 
study context, i.e. the intraorganizational relations within DNB, 25 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted. 
 
3.2 QUALITATIVE DATA RESEARCH 
Qualitative studies often show a strong focus on change and development and this includes 
studying how an organization's previous history shapes the present reality (Bryman & Bell 
2013:412). Pettigrew (1997:338) defines a process as “a sequence of individual and collective 
events, actions, and activities unfolding over time in context.” DNB’s operations in Poland 
can be viewed as a process because the longitudinal perspective has been studied and the aim 
was to further analyze how this process has developed and led to the current situation. The 
most suitable method to study a process is by applying a qualitative analysis (Bryman & Bell 
2013:412). As Cronbach (1975:123) suggests: the aim is to identify important factors that 
characterize the context or situation in question.  
 
Qualitative research interviews have been criticized for not being objective, and therefore 
lacking trustworthiness and validity (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). Kvale and Brinkmann 
further argue that questions in qualitative interviews often are biased, and that the material 
will be interpreted in a way that reflects the authors’ personal views and opinions. There are 
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different views on knowledge and in this thesis we have adopted a view from social 
constructionism, which states that the reality is subjective and that people perceive it 
differently (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Consequently, it is in this thesis acknowledged that being 
subjective is inevitable within qualitative research and therefore an attempt is made to 
carefully view the conclusions drawn from the interviews. Moreover, where there are 
references and other perspectives on the matter, these are applied to the analysis such that the 
analysis should not only reflect the constructionist view of the authors of the thesis.  
 
3.2.1	  CHOICE	  OF	  CONTEXT	  
To investigate the research question stated before of what factors that affect the relationship 
between a subsidiary and the headquarter, when trying to align the headquarters’ goals with 
the subsidiary, we have chosen to look at the relation between the HQ of the Norwegian bank 
DNB and one of its subsidiaries. More specifically we look at the relation between DNB's 
headquarters in Oslo, Norway and its subsidiary in Warsaw, Poland. This choice of context is 
considered highly relevant for several reasons. First of all there is a big difference in the 
environment that these two units experience, due to the complexity and competitiveness that 
characterize the Polish market. The market context of the HQ in Norway is quite the opposite, 
where they hold the leading market position in a market with high consolidation. Secondly, 
the historical development of DNB's operations in Poland has been complex and not 
completely unproblematic and straightforward, making the context further interesting to 
investigate.  
 
3.2.2	  DNB	  SUPERVISORS	  	  
After the choice of context was made in collaboration and consent with our supervisor at 
DNB’s headquarter in Oslo, Thomas Tønnessen, we were additionally assigned a supervisor 
in Warsaw, Magdalena Prusak. These two employees have functioned as a gateway into the 
corporate banking divisions in DNB Oslo and DNB Warsaw. The two DNB supervisors can 
be viewed as what Yin (2009) describes ‘key informants’. The supervisors have provided 
access and insight into the company as well as relevant information in general. Furthermore, 
they have facilitated interviews, arranged bookings etc. in accordance with the topic of the 
thesis. 
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3.2.3	  SELECTION	  OF	  INTERVIEWED	  RESPONDENTS	  
The selection of which employees to interview is primarily based on the employees 
connection to DNB’s operations in Poland as well as their experience from the relationship in 
question, with preference for longer term experiences. During meetings with the employees in 
Oslo a list of names of potentially relevant Polish employees was put together. As a result, the 
choice of respondents is not a random choice, but a choice that depends on the characteristics 
of the employees in Poland as well as the opinion of the employees in Oslo. We acknowledge 
that this decision could have been based on employees with a positive view of the 
organization and relationship, but this could not be avoided, as it was initially not possible for 
us to choose the interview objects ourselves.  
 
3.2.4	  CHOICE	  OF	  DATA	  COLLECTING	  
In order to make sure that the case study fulfills the criteria of reliability (Yin, 2009), the data 
collecting procedure is carefully described in this chapter. The objective is to enable another 
researcher to perform the same case study and, under the same circumstances, come to the 
same conclusions (Yin, 2009). Yin further argues that the emphasis should be placed on the 
same case, meaning that the ability to replicate the case is not the goal. This is crucial to 
understand, as this case is individual and unique, and since the research findings are 
dependent on the specific time-setting, context and additional external factors. 
 
3.2.5	  CHOICE	  OF	  METHOD	  
In order to conduct an investigation of the relationship between the headquarters and the 
subsidiary, a case study is to prefer. The reason is that deeper interviews with employees and 
managers can provide different perspectives on this relationship and should better enable the 
identification of cultural differences as well as give a better picture of people’s feelings, 
opinions and thoughts on the relationship.  
 
Due to time limits and monetary constraints, the addition of external observations on the HQ-
subsidiary relationship was not possible other than reviewing DNB’s website. In general, such 
observations may be useful for the analysis as the probability of biased perspectives on the 
relationship of the respondents is lower. However, the interpretation of such observations 
would still suffer from the potential biases on the part of the researcher. However, since we 
visited three ventures, we had the chance to develop our own general understanding of the 
environment and the culture. This understanding has served the purpose of a ‘snapshot 
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observation’, a small additional information source for our analysis (Bryman & Bell 2013). 
The extensive number of interviews undertaken together with a general understanding of the 
environment and the information from DNB’s website implies that the method for collecting 
material is one of triangulation, which further legitimizes the use of a case study (Denzin, 
1970).  
 
3.3 CASE STUDY AS RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
Eisenhardt (1989b) describes the case study as a research strategy where an understanding of 
the dynamics within single settings is the major focus. Within this single setting, a multiple- 
or single-case can be studied. As stated above, the empirical setting is DNB and the 
relationships between the units. Arguably, the case study design then is single-case with 
multiple units of analysis, which is also called ‘embedded’ design (Yin, 2006).  
 
Our intention when choosing to perform a case study was to find the underlying factors that 
affect the relationship between the units of analysis (Yin 2006). This means that we pose the 
question of ‘what’ (exploratory) instead of ‘how’ and ’why’ that are suggested by Yin (2006) 
to be a better match with a case study. Yin (2006) further explains that asking the question 
‘what’ can have two different underlying meanings. One of them, where the question ‘what’ 
is posed in order to explore something, is relevant for conducting an exploratory study. In this 
case study the approach can be argued to be a mix of an exploratory and explanatory 
approach, as we, in addition to asking the explorative question ‘what factors affect the 
relationship…’,  also examine ‘how’ an MNC can leverage its market-leading position 
(explanatory). Further, Yin argues that any research method can be suitable for exploratory 
research, including a case study. Yin (2006) suggests two additional conditions that make the 
case study the most relevant method for a specific research question. One of them is that the 
research should not require control of behavioral events. As the research in this paper 
addresses personal behaviors and employees’ subjective perceptions of events that have taken 
place at DNB, there is no need or wish to control them. The last condition that Yin poses is 
that the research within a case study focuses on contemporary events. The study performed 
was focusing on both contemporary and past events to get a longitudinal approach as well as 
to see how the situation changes over time. Bryman and Bell (2011) call this a ‘longitudinal 
case’. 
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It considered difficult to master a case study because it demands the interviewer to have an 
enriching dialog, intellectual capacity and the ability to formulate and ask necessary 
additional questions during the data collection (Yin, 2006). This is because the collection of 
data is not routinized and the relevant information is not always obvious or easy to predict 
(Yin 2006; Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). In an attempt to minimize such problems the topic of 
the thesis was introduced at the beginning of the interviews. This also served the purpose of 
guiding and inducing the interviewees in the area of interest, and of avoiding the gathering of 
information that was irrelevant for the case study.  
 
3.3.1	  PROCESS	  OF	  STUDY	  
The case study has neither been purely inductive or deductive. The case study was performed 
deductively in the process of shaping interview questions, as a theoretical knowledge base 
was established in the beginning of the process (Bryman & Bell, 2013). On the basis of 
theory, the interview questions were categorized under different themes. However, as the 
study for instance does not have any hypotheses that are being confirmed or rejected, it is not 
purely deductive (Bryman & Bell, 2011). Since the aim in this case study is to examine how 
25 employees express their opinions and views on the intraorganizational relationship in 
DNB, an inductive stance that lets the empirical findings be the basis of our ‘theory building’, 
is best suitable. When using an inductive research approach, the outcome of the research is 
theory (Bryman & Bell 2011). The ‘theory’ derived from inductive research is seldom more 
than empirical generalizations (Bryman & Bell, 2011).  
 
3.3.2	  CRITICAL	  APPROACH	  
Alvehus (2013) points out that a critical approach is not the same as being skeptical, but that 
is requires a large proficiency in the area and the ability to view a phenomenon from various 
perspectives. The theoretical chapter contains different angles in order to construct a wide and 
credible theoretical presentation. We have built up a profound knowledge base in order to 
examine the central dimensions, problems and possibilities that agency theory represents, just 
as Alvehus (2013) suggests. 
 
3.3.3	  THE	  BALANCE	  OF	  THEORETICAL	  AND	  PRACTICAL	  EMPHASIS	  
Some researchers suggest that theory is not applicable to practical cases (Mason 2002). In this 
thesis theories have been used, as mentioned above, as tools to create a language to interpret 
information (Alvehus 2013; Merriam, 1994). ‘Theory’ can be defined in many different ways 
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since a large variation of theories exist (Merriam, 1994), and Knowles (1984:5) argue that: “a 
theory is what a certain author argue that it is”.  Based on this, we emphasize that what is 
categorized under the headers ‘theoretical problematization’ and ‘theoretical review’ in this 
paper, is made up from different types of theory, from simple ‘ways to understand the reality’ 
(Bogdan & Biklen, 1982) to ‘substantive theories’ that are more concrete (Merriam, 1994). 
The theoretical framework is a central part of the argumentation within the thesis because 
theories provide an overview and a perspective on things, and they contribute with concepts 
and models (Alvehus, 2013) to interpret the empirical data presented below. The introductory 
problematization is emphasizing both the theoretical knowledge base and the practical 
material generated from the case study.  
 
3.4 INTERVIEWS 
To study the relationship between subsidiary and headquarter, interviews with employees 
within DNB have been performed. The empirical data collection consists of semi-structured 
interviews with 25 employees at DNB. Of the interviews 19 were made face-to-face and 6 
were made on conference-call. 7 of the interviewed employees work in Norway, 12 in Poland 
and 6 are working in Sweden, lasted around 60 minutes each. DNB Sweden will be used as a 
comparison to add further perspectives on the HQ and branch relationship. The emphasis in 
the analysis will be on the corporate banking operations in DNB Poland.  
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3.4.1	  INTERVIEW	  DETAILS	  
	  
Table 2, Interview details 
Date Name Position Interview0method Office
Anders0Grevstad Head%of%DNBs%International%Corporate%division Face%to%face,%single Oslo,%Norway
Thomas0Tønnessen Head%of%Administration%DNB%Corporate%division Face%to%face,%single Oslo,%Norway
Øivind0Tønnessen Senior%Relationship%Manager%TMT%DNB Face%to%face,%single Oslo,%Norway
Rokas0Bancevičius Business%Analyst%DNB%Corporate%division%TMT Face%to%face,%single Oslo,%Norway
Anne0Hvistendahl Global%Head%of%Foods%DNB Face%to%face,%single Oslo,%Norway
Tony0Samuelsen Member%of%the%Supervisory%Council Conference%call,%single Oslo,%Norway
Szymon0Adamczyk Head%of%TMT%Poland Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Adam0Żelezik Managing%Director%of%Corporate%Banking%Division Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Eline0Skramstad Member%of%the%Supervisory%Council,%Senior%Credit%Officer%Poland Conference%call,%single Oslo,%Norway
Marcin0Prusak Head%of%Sector%Desks Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Artur0Tomaszewski CEO%Poland,%Member%of%the%management%board Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Olof0Seidel CFO%Poland,%Member%of%the%management%board Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Piotr0Kaczmarski Head%of%Business%Development Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Olga0Plewicka0 Relationship%Manager,%Manufacturing%&%Foods Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Alistair0de0Villiers Head%of%Corporate%Banking,%Member%of%the%management%board,%Expat%from%DNB%Oslo Conference%call,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Magdalena0Prusak Credit%Process%Coordinator Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Anna0Smolarczyk Credit%Analyst Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Ewa0Banasiuk Senior%Advisor,%TMT,%Seafood%&%Healthcare Face%to%face,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Ulf0Strandberg Senior%Relationship%Manager%L%Head%of%Healthcare Face%to%face,%multiple Stockholm,%Sweden
Johan0Sjögren Senior%Relationship%Manager%L%Head%of%Manufacturing%IndustriesFace%to%face,%multiple Stockholm,%Sweden
Erik0Engström Relationship%Manger%Manufacturing%Industries Face%to%face,%multiple Stockholm,%Sweden
David0Palmér Credit%analyst%Healthcare%and%Manufacturing Face%to%face,%single Stockholm,%Sweden
Mar06th Maria0Skogeryd Trade%&%Export%Finance%Sales%at%DNB,%previous%Credit%analyst%DNB%Poland Phone%call,%single Stockholm,%Sweden
Mar026th Wojciech0Dyk Head%of%Strategy,%Marketing%and%Product%Development% Phone%call,%single Warsaw,%Poland
Apr017th0 Peter0Carlsson0 CEO,%Head%of%Northern%Europe%division Phone%call,%single Stockholm,%Sweden
Mar02nd
Feb012th
Feb011th
Jan026th
Jan025th
Feb013th
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3.4.2	  DISCLOSING	  THE	  PARTICIPANTS	  IDENTITIES	  
Disclosing the identities of the corporation and the interviewees has two helpful outcomes 
according to Yin (2009). First of all, the reader can apply prior knowledge about the case to 
the study and secondly, auditing the quotes and the material is easier. Grinyer (2002) 
underlines the importance of giving the participants a possibility to influence the interview to 
avoid leaving them with the impression that they ‘lost’ the ownership of their stories. 
Disclosing the name of the corporation and the names of the interviewees also increases the 
credibility of the study (Bryman & Bell 2013).  
 
3.4.3	  INTERVIEWS	  WITH	  HEADQUARTERS	  IN	  OSLO,	  NORWAY	  
The purpose of the initial interviews in Oslo was to gather background information regarding 
DNB’s operations in Poland. The first interviews were performed with an open approach. We 
concluded that DNB did not have any specific preferences regarding what the thesis should 
generate. DNB was satisfied with a relevant topic, and supported us with the empirical 
material for our thesis.  
 
We learned that entirely open interviews are more difficult to evaluate and compile and that 
they easily get out of focus, as every interview is different, just as Bryman and Bell (2011) 
suggest. Still, we found that open interviews in this first stage was essential, not to limit the 
respondent’s answers (Andersson 1994).  
 
3.4.4	  PERFORMING	  SEMI-­‐STRUCTURED	  INTERVIEWS	  
The choice of semi-structured interviews when collecting the empirical data was made in 
order to make sure that potentially differing perspectives of the respondents on DNB’s 
internal relationships were revealed. The extensive amount of interviews from three different 
units helps us to achieve a higher research quality through construct validity (Yin, 2009). We 
started from a template with different themes, or ‘constructs’, as Eisenhardt (1989b) defines 
it, and followed up with questions that would make the respondent elaborate further on the 
topic. According to Eisenhardt (1989b), it is rewarding to start off with a specification of the 
constructs that will most likely be valuable within the theory building later on in the process. 
Setting up semi-structured interviews with predetermined questions and subjects might hinder 
information that is essential for the thesis to reach the surface. We found it to be on the 
contrary. By covering pre-specified themes during the interviews we assured that certain areas 
of importance were not missed. The semi-structure allowed the interviewee to answer more 
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flexibly as well as to add additional thoughts on the theme. Further, we asked if there was 
additional information the respondent wanted us to know about. We applied ‘Probes’ as 
interview technique, which meant that we utilized pauses, encouragement, continued 
elaboration, repetition and clarification (Andersson, 1994). Both authors of this thesis were 
present during the interviews and the material was jointly interpreted in order to minimize 
biased interpretations. 
 
3.4.5	  ITERATIVE	  COLLECTION	  OF	  DATA	  
The collection of data has been an iterative process. It became obvious after the first review of 
the material that some additional material was needed in order to complement areas of further 
interest (Bryman & Bell 2013). In order to receive more empirical data, yet without traveling 
to the various offices in Warsaw, Stockholm or Oslo, selected interviewees answered a few 
questions by email or in shorter additional phone calls. By utilizing an iterative process, we 
have been able to cover areas that otherwise may have been missed during the interviews. 
 
3.4.6	  PREPARATIONS	  AND	  PERFORMING	  THE	  INTERVIEWS	  
Andersson (1994) presents advice regarding what to think about when performing interviews. 
First of all he suggests that the interview questions should be properly connected to the 
research question and the purpose. Furthermore, Andersson points to several issues that 
researchers often cross as well as recommendations on how to avoid failures. For example he 
argues that to avoid attacking too large areas, you need to conceptualize relevant concepts, 
trying not to be too ambiguous. Before the interviews we prepared by reviewing literature, 
studies and methodology in order to find and formulate relevant interview questions. As 
interviews are interactive, it is difficult to foresee how an interview will proceed. Factors that 
can affect the respondent during the interview cannot be prepared for in advance (Andersson 
1994). During the interviews we tried to find the right tone in our conversations. Additionally, 
when preparing for the interviews, we took into consideration what to wear and how to 
behave whilst visiting DNB’s corporate banking offices.  
 
The relationship between Poland and its principals may be a sensitive question for some of 
the employees as the relationship has not always has been successful. Alvesson (2011) states 
that it is of importance to bear in mind that respondents often wish to draw up a more positive 
picture and that sensitive subjects are hard to discuss. This may complicate the process of 
discovering the true relationship between the HQ and the subsidiary. The operations in Poland 
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during some periods can be regarded as a ‘failure’, and therefore as a more sensitive matter. 
To try to minimize this problem our initial aim was to interview a previous employee at DNB, 
as he or she perhaps could be more prone to provide us with a more objective view of the 
relationship. This, however, turned out to be too time consuming in relation to the limited 
time we had to write this thesis.   
 
An important part of the preparation for the data collection was the preparation to conduct 
interviews with respondents from different cultures. It was fundamental to be familiar with 
the respondents' different cultural backgrounds as well as to be prepared for varying interview 
interaction between the respondents in regards to for example directness and modes of 
questioning (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). It came as a positive surprise that the Polish 
employees showed great willingness to talk about the relationship between the HQ and the 
subsidiary. It was not always necessary to ask all questions from the template document since 
the respondents thoroughly presented their opinions on all the themes. Moreover, we are 
aware of that many of the top managers are likely to have received media training and we 
tried to take this aspect into account when conducting these interviews.  
 
3.5 SECONDARY DATA 
In this section it is presented how the theoretical material, or secondary data, has been 
collected and what has been made in order to present the material justly and at the same time 
avoiding plagiarism. 
 
3.5.1	  LITERATURE	  RESEARCH	  
Our literature research phase followed Deane’s (2010) advice in order to locate sources and 
assessing the value of sources in a systematic way before starting to read. Deane further 
emphasizes the importance of having a critical approach to the sources and to also integrate 
critique when writing. The major method to find relevant material and sources within our area 
has been to follow similar studies and to follow up on their reference lists. To illustrate an 
example of this the review made by Eisenhardt (1989) presents former authors that have 
examined and studied agency theory. The mentioned authors and findings in Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) review are references that we have followed up and studied further. A more updated 
literature review that we have used in an equivalently way is the review by Hoenen and 
Kostova (2015). In their review they examine agency theory applied to HQ-subsidiary 
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relationships from a broader perspective. Howard (2007) emphasizes that it is important to 
learn how to avoid plagiarism in order to improve and sharpen your own work and research, 
based on former findings. In our research we attempt to study DNBs operations in Poland 
from an agency framework extended with additional factors. We are aware of that there are 
many previous studies in this area. Our aim is to learn from these studies and to build on their 
findings with the conclusion from our research.  
 
3.5.2	  CRITICISM	  AND	  ACADEMIC	  INTEGRITY	  
Lunsford (2009) stresses that an author will come across as a more honest writer if he or she 
is explicit about what sources have been used in the research and if he or she can signal 
academic integrity. Deane (2010) emphasizes the importance for authors to have a critical 
mindset throughout the research and to use sources that are relevant, readily available and 
reliable. In the literature research we have solely used credible sources, such as scientific 
journals and articles that strictly retain high academic standards. Google Scholars, Lund 
University’s database ‘LOVISA’ and LUB Search for instance have been our major literature 
search databases. To find articles that match our topic we have used search-word such as 
‘agency theory’, ‘multinational corporates’, HQ-subsidiary relationship’. Additionally we 
have spent many hours at the library, scanning through books on the topic in order to get 
information from various sources. 
 
3.5.3	  PLAGIARISM	  
Avoiding plagiarism has been important for us. In order to avoid plagiarism we have kept full 
records of date of publications and noted page numbers for data and quotes throughout the 
research, as suggested by Deane (2010). We decided upon a method to handle the research in 
the beginning of the study, where the full information had to be written down straight away 
when finding new relevant sources. By initiating this, we have avoided the risk of missing out 
to present proper references. Throughout the thesis the Harvard referencing model has been 
applied.  
 
3.5.4	  PEER	  REVIEW	  
Deane (2010) highlights that “peer reviewing is a process designed to ensure the quality, 
reliability and originality of published material.” Two master students peer reviewed the 
manuscript during a middle term seminar on the 16th of March. This is a way to increase the 
construct validity of our study (Yin 2009).  
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3.5.5	  ADVICE	  AND	  GUIDELINES	  FROM	  LITERATURE	  AND	  SUPERVISOR	  
To continuously keep a good track during our research we have read various methodological 
books to remind ourselves on how to properly write a good thesis and how to present 
academic research correctly. Rienecker and Jörgensen (2014), Winter (1992) and Andersson 
(1994) are some examples of relevant literature that has generated recommendations, advice 
and guidelines.  
 
During the process of writing this master thesis, our supervisor from Lund University, 
Magnus Johansson, has given us recommendations, guidelines and valuable advice to 
accomplish a well-written master thesis. We had six meetings during the spring that lasted 
approximately one hour each. The supervision has been helpful and it has functioned both as 
smaller deadlines during the progress and as a check that we were working in the right 
direction. 
 
3.6 AUDITING THE MATERIAL 
The data has been gathered and selected following a roadmap by Eisenhardt (1989b) as well 
as Merriam (1994), describing how to build theories from case study research using methods 
such as grounded theory, pattern matching and triangulation.  
 
3.6.1	  TRANSCRIBING	  THE	  MATERIAL	   	   	   	  
The collected interview material has been transcribed, analyzed and interpreted in accordance 
with Andersson (1994) and Mason (2002). All the 25 recorded interviews have been 
transcribed to ensure that all the material could be processed (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). 
This process generated 242 (A4) pages with empirical material. This material was thereafter 
categorized using ‘categorical indexing’ (Mason, 2002). The categorization is based on 
important aspects raised in the theoretical framework such as path dependency, 
communication, collaboration between HQ and Subsidiary, trust, etc. This was to 
systematically establish categories based on a common index from the empirical data. 
Furthermore, all material concerning one topic, for instance path dependency, was processed 
and summarized into one chapter that is presented in the empirical material below. This has 
been done in accordance to Andersson (1994), who emphasize how essential it is to separate 
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the material into various categories, enabling the possibility to analyze, compare, and find 
similarities in the interviewees’ answers.  
 
As stated by Alvehus (2013) it is important to acknowledge what final conclusions can be 
made based on what methodology and investigation has been conducted. The empirical 
material is secluded from the analysis in order to present a separate empirical chapter that 
stands alone, based only on the empirical data.  
 
3.6.2	  GROUNDED	  THEORY	  &	  PATTERN	  MATCHING	  
In the process of collecting data, analyzing it and building theory, grounded theory is 
perceived as the most beneficial and common method (Bryman & Bell, 2011). According to 
Kendall (1999), there is a controversy between Glaser’s (1992) approaches to grounded 
theory methodology (GTM) in contrast to Strauss and Corbin (1990), which makes it 
important for us to discuss how we have chosen to apply GTM. 
 
In this thesis, important themes have emerged from the process of data collection, which has 
been altered with analysis in an iterative process (Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2009). This is 
argued to be one of two central features within the grounded theory method according to 
Bryman and Bell (2011). The other feature proposed by Bryman and Bell is that theory has 
been derived out of data, and this feature is as relevant in this case study as the first one. The 
extensional ‘theories’ that we contributed with have been a process of constant comparison 
and are based on collected empirical data and by doing this; we have applied grounded theory, 
according to Merriam (1994). 
 
This thesis focuses on factors that affect the relationship between subsidiary and HQ. The 
process of measuring what factors, or independent variables, that affect the relationship can 
take the shape of ’axial coding’ as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990). In order to 
analyze this, the factors from the theoretical framework have been connected to concepts and 
expressions found in the empirical material (Saunders et al., 2009.) To be able to do this, 
some dependent variables of the relationship between subsidiary–HQ needs to be derived. 
According to the theoretical discussion, goal congruence, goal achievement and goal 
commitment functions as dependent variables, and the relationship is the overarching 
dependent variable. The theoretical discussion above presents three independent variables 
(communication, integration and collaboration) that affect the seven factors (information 
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asymmetry, risk, control, social and contextual, path-dependency, trust and attention). These 
factors in turn affect the dependent variables goal congruence, goal commitment, and goal 
achievement.  
In alignment with the social constructionist view that follows an interpretive reasoning we 
have studied how the three subjective independent variables (communication, collaboration 
and integration) affect the relationship in this case. As Saunders et al. (2009:111) state: ”it is 
necessary to explore the subjective meanings motivating the actions of social actors in order 
for the researcher to be able to understand these actions.” A quantitative researcher would 
have criticized this method of being too subjective when we have not applied any actual 
numbers to measure how the factors affect the relationship, but this is being done because we 
hold the social constructionist view.  
When analyzing the empirical material, pattern matching has been applied. This is the most 
desirable technique for case studies according to Yin (2009). The empirical material has been 
thoroughly sorted and analyzed and subsequently it has, if possible, been matched with the 
factors brought up in the theoretical framework. Yin argues that when these ‘patterns’ match, 
the internal validity is strengthened. Pattern matching and following, grounded theory, is a 
process of constant comparison that generates new theories (Yin, 2009; Kendall, 1999). 
 
In Chapter 8.0 below, a discussion reflecting the introductory problematization will be 
presented in order to widen the understanding of the context in this thesis. As stated by 
Alvehus (2013) it is important to acknowledge what kind of final conclusions that can be 
formed based on what methodology and investigation has been made. To create a 
straightforward dialogue and distinctly indicate the contribution of this thesis (Alvehus, 
2013), suggestions for further research studying the relationship between subsidiary-HQ 
within MNCs will be presented. 
 
3.6.3	  ABOUT	  THE	  AUTHORS	  
Both authors study master’s degree in Business Strategy and have a 3.5 year background of 
relevant theories and knowledge within the area of business strategy and economics. Both 
authors wrote a bachelor thesis in spring 2014 and have therefore earlier experience and 
understanding of writing an academic thesis. One of the authors have worked part-time at the 
School of Economics library and therefore withhold information regarding how to find 
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relevant literature, search in databases et cetera. The other author has previously worked at 
DNB and has former insight and knowledge about DNB Norway’s corporate banking 
division. 
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4 EMPIRICAL MATERIAL 
The following empirical material will first of all illustrate the focal research area; the 
relationship between DNB’s Polish subsidiary – its HQ in Norway, as well as its branch in 
Sweden. A background, timeline and the legal structure of the Polish unit are featured, 
followed by an empirical ‘story’, narrated by the interview material from the various ventures.  
 
4.1 FOCUS WITHIN DNB 
The hierarchical formation between the three focal ventures is illustrated and explained in 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1, ‘Hierarchical formation’.  
DNB’s HQ is located in Oslo, Norway. Stockholm, Sweden is a branch to DNB Norway and 
reports to respective industry head at HQ. DNB Poland is a subsidiary to DNB Norway and it 
reports to respective sector head in either Oslo or Stockholm. DNB Stockholm is head of 
DNB’s general operations in Poland, making DNB Poland an agent for both DNB Norway 
and DNB Sweden, its principals. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND DNB POLAND 
In the years before the financial crisis, DNB wanted to expand further and had an optimistic 
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outlook. As the Norwegian market could only offer limited growth, DNB started to look for 
other opportunities to expand. Thomas Tønnessen explains: “Due to the fact that the market 
at the time had strong expectations to growth. DNB had limited potential for growth in 
Norway so we had to look elsewhere.  The NORD/LB Joint Venture then looked as a very 
good option.” This is the reasoning behind why DNB, ‘DNB NOR’ at that time, engaged in a 
joint venture with the German bank NORD/LB. The joint venture was established in 2006, 
51% owned by DNB and 49% owned by Nord/LB, with the goal to grow in both the Baltic 
regions and in Poland. Several of the interviewees point out the difficulty in managing a joint 
venture successfully between two banks with different strategies. One of the employees in 
DNB Poland stated: “it was like having two mothers, who neither cared for us.” The financial 
crisis reached the banking sector in Poland in 2008, affecting the joint venture negatively. It is 
suggested by interviewees in Norway that the collaboration was lacking effort, structure and 
efficient decision-making. The joint venture came to an end in 2010 when DNB bought 
NORD/LBs 49% shares and became 100% owner. After the acquirement, DNB tried to sell 
the Polish operations, but did not receive satisfying enough offers from potential buyers. 
Eventually, DNB decided to sell the retail operation to an external buyer, ending up with only 
corporate banking operations in Poland in 2012. A timeline of the most significant historical 
events is introduced below in Figure 2. 
Figure 2, Historical Timeline DNB Poland 
 
 
2006  
Corporate Bank Profile – 
DNB Joint venture with 
NORD/LB 	  
2007 
Universal Bank Profile – 
 DNB and NORD/LB 
acquired Retail Bank 
2010 
DNB acquired 
NORD/LB shares –
100% owner of Polish 
operations 
2012 
DNB expatriate 
(Alistair) in Poland 
 
 
2014 
Corporate Bank Profile – 
DNB Poland part of 
Northern Europe division	  
2011 
DNB bank out for sale – 
Sold retail operations – 
New DNB Strategy  	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4.2.1	  INDEPENDENT	  SUBSIDIARY	  OF	  DNB	  
DNB headquarter is located in Oslo, Norway. The banking group constitutes of 18 worldwide 
branches (DNB Annual Report, 2014). Traditionally DNB grow into new ventures 
organically, as opposed to by mergers or acquisitions, as was the case in Poland. DNB’s 
operations in Poland differ as well due to the subsidiary structure instead of the branch 
structure adopted at other international ventures. As suggested in the interviews, DNB Poland 
is independent, it withhold its own jurisdictional unit, balance sheet, and separate capital 
lending limits. The legal structure of subsidiary affects how DNB Poland can operate. Alistair 
De Villiers points out that PFSA (Polish Financial Supervisory Authority) protect the polish 
companies and the Polish economy from foreign capital by setting up strict requirements for 
international banks operating on it. 
Øivind Tønnessen, Head of TMT industry sector in Poland, notes that revenues from Poland 
are reported separately and that this is problematic. He explains: “we get revenues from New 
York and London, but not Poland. Because they are their own bank and have their own 
system.” Rokas Bancevičius, Analyst in DNB Oslo comments that because of this, some work 
is being done simultaneously, requiring lots of coordination between Oslo and Poland. 
Furthermore, being an independent subsidiary, Poland is not connected to DNB’s intranet, 
making them excluded from the internal information and contact lists. Olga Plewicka and 
Maria Skogeryd among other employees in Poland, suggest that the information sharing could 
be improved if this was changed. 
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4.2.2	  COMPETITIVE	  MARKET	  	  
Table 3 below presents facts on the different market contexts that respective venture operate 
in. 
 
Facts, Market Context 
Country Norway Sweden Poland 
Concentration of banks* High Medium/High Low 
Foreign banks1 33% > 10 % 70% 
Regulations, reporting* Yearly Yearly Quarterly 
DNB corporate banking ranking* No 1 No 6 No 20 
Market position* Leader Challenger Challenger 
	  
Table 3, Market Context 
 
The Polish banking sector is known for its competitiveness and the majority of the 
interviewed persons underline the complexity of this. Marcin Prusak points out: 
The Polish banking industry has always been too crowded. There were too many banks 
wanting to do business in Poland, resulting that the competition has been very fierce 
during the last 15-20 years and it has always been stated that there are too many banks 
in Poland, basically. 
Artur Tomaszewski agrees on this and points out that DNB is competing with at least 20 other 
banks in the market. Olof Seidel, CFO in Poland, remarks: ”in some areas in Poland there are 
more retail bank offices than grocery stores!” Foreign banking groups own more than two 
thirds of the banking sector assets in Poland (Capital Strategy, 2012), see Table 1 for 
comparison to the other market contexts. 
4.2.3	  POLISH	  FINANCIAL	  SUPERVISORY	  AUTHORITY	  (PFSA)	  	  
The interviewees suggest it is difficult to compete on the polish market because of the strict 
regulations set by PFSA. Olof Seidel states: “PFSA is known to be a demanding financial 
regulator in Europe. The Polish banking sector was the only banking sector that hasn’t had 
any mayor difficulties during the financial crisis.” Eline Skramstad and Anders Grevstad 
conclude that PFSA are rather strict, bureaucratic and time consuming. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Based on the empirical material 1	  European Commission (2014) *	  Based	  on	  the	  interviews	  *	  Based	  on	  the	  interviews	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Many of the interviewees emphasize an importance for DNB to accept international rules and 
regulations when conducting banking operations outside Norway. David Palmér remarks that 
the Polish FSA has a very detailed insight in the banks and requires quarterly reporting on key 
figures for all clients as opposed to annual reporting in Sweden and Norway. Norway is not 
part of the EU and therefore not in all areas subjected to similar regulatory requirements, as 
explained by Olof Seidel:  
 
It’s always a conflict between being a customer oriented and efficient bank and at the 
same time being exposed to PFSA, who has significant regulatory needs. And it’s not 
only PFSA but also the European supervisory governments such as EBA and ECB and I 
know that Norwegian regulator has very demanding Capital solvency requirement but 
the reporting needs for a smaller subsidiary like DNB Poland are challenging.  
 
4.3 CHALLENGER VERSUS MARKET LEADER 
Anders Grevstad and several other interviewees state that DNB is one of the world’s most 
solid banks. An important aspect Peter Carlsson among others point out, is that DNB is the 
largest bank in Norway, but not in other countries it operate in. To challenge, he states, is 
completely different to being dominant. Anders Grevstad observes this as well, and admires 
employees who are brave and skilled enough, choosing to work for a small, niched bank 
abroad, instead of remaining in Norway, where DNB holds the market leader position. Marcin 
Prusak agrees, and comments that in Poland they have to fight to be able to grow and 
establish a strong position on the market, because they are a challenger. Adam Żelezik points 
out that banks need to be proactive and approach clients due to the tough competitiveness in 
the Polish banking sector and subsequently, companies do not need to look for a financier. 
Being part of the largest banking group in Norway is a key argument to show the clients that 
its subsidiary in Poland is reliable and stable by executing the same large Corporate Strategy 
as its parent bank, according to Szymon Adamczyk. Olof Seidel additionally emphasizes:  
DNB’s value proposition is very successful in defined global industries. And Norway 
has got a very positive image as well as DNB. What we actually do is be an ambassador 
for the global LCI (Large Corporates and International Division) by marketing the 
brand DNB, to attract the clients. 
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Marcin Prusak suggests that being part of the DNB group is helpful when approaching 
potential clients; there is a financial aspect to this relationship. By showing large transactions 
made on group level, their attractiveness increases. Adam Żelezik underlines that it is 
preferable to work together with the colleagues from Oslo who hold knowledge and expertise 
to a higher extent, especially when approaching clients within industries they are not as well 
experienced within.  
The Swedish interviewees confirm that DNB is a challenger in Sweden just like in Poland. 
Olof Seidel explains that he thinks that Stockholm and Poland in the long run have a similar 
strategy due to this, and also because both are in a competitive market. Maria Skogeryd 
further explains that it is a challenge that the Swedish market differs from the Norwegian 
market and that her Norwegian colleagues sometimes lack understanding for this. In Norway 
DNB is market leader and the number the one choice while in Sweden DNB is a challenger 
on a market with fierce competition. She furthermore explains that due to DNB’s position and 
the fierce completion DNB Sweden need to be more service-minded and offer better products 
and services than the competitors to win deals. Ulf Strandberg believes it to be good for the 
cooperation that there exist a historical link between Swedish subcontractors and 
manufacturing companies in Poland. Moreover, Maria Skogeryd states that there are 
similarities but there are also differences. In Sweden the employees complains about hard 
competition, competing against 5 or 6 banks, but in Poland the number of active banks are 10 
times as large and the shape of the market is completely different. 
 
4.4 NORTHERN EUROPE DIVISION 
Poland was formerly part of the M&A division internally in DNB but has been incorporated 
into the Northern Europe Division. As Sweden has more subcontractors in Poland than 
Norway due to the industry formation and focus of the Swedish industry. Therefore it was a 
natural decision to match DNB Poland in the Northern Europe division, Peter Carlsson, 
responsible for operations in Poland and positioned in Sweden, argues. He remarks that: 
Well, they feel they have gotten a home. Earlier they were under the M&A sector, and 
you can tell by the name that it is not a long-term strategic possession but something 
that can be bought and sold any day. 
Artur Tomasewski state: ”I think we were happy that we were merged into the Northern 
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Europe division of DNB last year. So we are not left alone, we are part of the bigger group, 
which is supervised from Sweden”. He further comments that Peter Carlsson help him to 
represent their interests in Norway, and that this helps because Peter has a stronger influence 
on HQ. 
Olof Seidel remarks that DNB Poland is far away from the headquarters in Oslo, but ever 
since they became part of the Northern Europe division Poland has become more strategically 
important for DNB as an integrated part of the division and thereby offering financial services 
to important cross-border customers in the relation between Northern Europe and Poland. Ulf 
Strandberg agrees and adds that the credit analysis reporting from Poland became more 
globally integrated with DNB: “We are much more ONE bank now when talking about 
credits, we involve both Poland and Norway.” 
 
4.5 STRATEGY AND GOAL CONGRUENCE 
Eline Skramstad underlines that because of the historical development and some bad deals 
that were made in 2009-2011, the quality of the portfolio in Poland is not considered to be 
good enough yet. Eline Skramstad suggests: “there are many reasons as to why we had a 
misfortunate launch in Poland.” David Palmér agrees and further explains: “The portfolio was 
rather mixed and there were some pretty bad engagements. A lot was out of strategy and 
there were many small clients.” 
Marcin Prusak comments: 
The whole process and complicated history made an impact on me that you know, being 
aware that nothing should be taken for granted, times change, conditions change, 
regardless of what you do and how you do you will always face some situations like that 
when you are to be made redundant. Sometimes it is basically not because it is your 
fault, because of some other issues at a much higher level. 
Wojciech Dyk identifies that employees in Poland previously were skeptical about the various 
strategies that have been implemented over the last 10 years and because of this quite a few 
employees left DNB. He emphasize that in times of changes it takes persistence and 
consistency in convincing people that they are a part of a greater strategy. He argues: “We 
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need to prove that we are valuable for the organization, that we can deliver the targets and 
deliver results.” 
To execute the strategy, it is a must to attract and retain talented and motivated employees in 
line with the values of DNB. Olof Seidel continues, that the bank in the past has been 
experiencing larger restructuring measures by re-focusing its strategy: Therefore it is crucial 
that employees believe that DNB is a stable employer with and integrated culture and values. 
Recent employee and customer satisfaction surveys shows that DNB Poland is aligned with 
other DNB entities– so we are on a good path.  
4.5.1	  IMPLEMENTING	  NEW	  STRATEGIES	  
It is suggested by the interviewees that when DNB fully acquired the operations in Poland and 
becoming the sole stakeholder, there was a wide and universal strategy in employed for Polish 
operations. It was not always perfectly clear what the long-term strategic objectives were. 
Piotr Kaczmarski states that DNB at the time was “everywhere in the market”. After 
completing the acquisition of the Polish venture, a new strategy was implemented focusing on 
limited, sector oriented corporate banking, and this is the strategy at DNB Poland that prevails 
today. Artur Tomasewski explains that the implementation of the new direction for Poland 
was a fair process, based on the objectives provided by the HQ. The Polish operations, 
portfolio and local peculiarities were recognized and taken into consideration when 
implementing the corporate banking strategy. 
DNB agreed to set less strict boundaries regarding the industry strategies in Poland in order to 
enable an improvement of the portfolio DNB Poland had at the time. Alistair de Villiers 
explains that every 2-3 years the management board in Poland proposes a strategy to be 
approved by the HQ, which functions like a roadmap for the operations in Poland. The 
interviewees note that implementing a new strategy is time-consuming. This is because the 
application of the strategy needs to be approved by both HQ and PFSA before it can be taken 
into action. The management board in Poland was allowed to develop a suitable and local 
strategy to be aligned with DNB and HQ’s expectations in the long run. Wojciech Dyk 
describes that a lot of effort has been made to align the structure as much as possible to the 
structure that exists in the group, after the corporate banking strategy was put into action in 
Poland. In 2014, HQ accepted the new LCI strategy for the Polish venture, and from now on it 
has a larger resemblance of a ‘normal bank’ (Olof Seidel).  
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4.6 POLAND ALIGNED WITH HQ STRUCTURE   
Large Corporates and International (LCI) focus on different industry sector strategies. The 
sectors in Poland that are examined in this context are TMT, MI, HC and SF. The 
interviewees identifies that TMT is an industry sector that has been growing in a successful 
manner during the past two years in Poland. The Polish and Norwegian ventures have to a 
larger extent collaborated when approaching certain clients within TMT compared to other 
sectors. The MI industry sector is large, working with many Swedish subcontractors. The MI 
strategy and its range of potential clients is not as strictly defined as the HC industry sector, 
that has strict and well-defined strategic guidelines. The fourth industry; SF, has limited 
operations in Poland and is subsequently not overly represented in the empirical chapter. 
The target lists are brought forward by each Polish industry sector and thereafter, respective 
sector head in Sweden or Norway check and evaluate the list of top targets from the target list 
together with Polish counterparties. After this process, employees in Poland can begin to 
approach the selected clients. Due to the set-up based on core targets and a detailed strategic 
objective, the strategy is found as clearly aligned with DNB’s guidelines. Adam Żelezik 
describes: 
We established industrial desks covering the structure of what we have in the HQ, and 
we are following the particular sub strategies for some industrial sectors. We are fully 
aligned in this context, or in 90 percent aligned, because the threshold is still a little bit 
lower. But we will increase it gradually in next year. 
Anders Grevstad emphasizes that the client portfolio in Poland to a large extent is in line with 
DNB’s industry focused strategy, but notes that numerous clients in the portfolio would not 
have been there if it was not for the joint venture. Further he states that within 4-5 years there 
will be no difference between Poland and the rest of DNB’s international hubs that are totally 
industry driven. 
The interviewees in Stockholm indicate a different point of view regarding the strategic 
alignment with DNB Poland. Johan Sjögren mention that his Polish colleagues from time to 
time work outside the Nordic MI strategy, yet further he proposes that this may be due to the 
fact that MI Poland has a broader target list and thereby is harder to strategically define. Ulf 
Strandberg and Johan Sjögren identifies that the TMT and HC sector have been more 
successful in communicating the business strategy, and its directives. They have more or less 
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established a common understanding within the sector teams. An important aspect that Ulf 
Strandberg and Johan Sjögren point out is that employees from Poland from time to time 
request a ‘desk opinion’ that possibly can be resource demanding.  
David Palmér points out that DNB’s strategy may suit some markets better than others since it 
is based on the Norwegian market and its business mindset. Olof Seidel states: “the strategy 
only based on Norwegian companies in Poland is too narrow. Therefore our strategy is not a 
Norwegian strategy only, but to base on a selected sector strategy where the parent bank has 
a proven track-record.” Additionally, Peter Carlsson indicates that it is important to honor the 
individuality of the local environment and that the customer behavior differ between markets, 
explaining: “the essence is the customer behavior and it is primarily a Polish customer 
behavior. It’s not a Norwegian customer behavior, and it is not a Norwegian customer 
behavior in Sweden either.” 
 
4.6.1	  CLEAR	  STRATEGY	  
The management in Poland suggests that it is helpful to have a clear strategy towards the 
employees. Wojciech Dyk remarks: “it was a difficult task and a big change but we see the 
result of this already.” Piotr Kaczmarski points out that it was demotivating when there were 
large misunderstandings regarding what the new strategy implied. He put a lot of effort into a 
certain engagement but found out half a year later that the HQ did not approve it, since it was 
not in line with the strategy. Due to this misunderstanding, Piotr Kaczmarski ended up having 
difficulties reaching the annual targets, which was frustrating. After applying the new strategy 
towards corporate and sector desks Tony Samuelsen finds that the atmosphere amongst the 
employees within the group has improved. Additionally Wojciech Dyk suggests that the level 
of trust has increased after the new clear strategy was implemented, 
I think it took more or less these two years to build trust. And I think now we are at the 
stage where people also trust the strategy of the group, and they trust that this is the 
long-term strategy. 
The increased level of trust has grown into a curiosity about how DNB Poland can leverage as 
well as contribute with knowledge to the group, Wojciech Dyk argues. 
4.6.2	  KPI	  AND	  BALANCED	  SCORECARD	  
In the end of 2013, DNB initiated balanced scorecards for the entire bank, cascaded down to 
each department with KPIs and goals to be fulfilled. Each of the KPI’s are linked to the top 
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level of the organization, making everyone aware of what is expected from every department. 
The results were assessed for the first time in 2014, and in 2015 the balanced scorecards will 
be updated accordingly. Wojciech Dyk comments: “we want to do this every year, so that 
everybody knows what is expected from them and how it corresponds with the targets of the 
entire organization.” 
 
Piotr Kaczmarski points out that the values and goals are straightforward and understandable, 
and that everyone is aware of how to fulfill the goals in accordance to the objectives from 
HQ. Piotr Kaczmarski explains: 
If it is out of our strategy, full stop, we don’t go further with analysis. We don’t spend 
time on that, we don’t spend time on considerations like ‘maybe I will convince 
someone, maybe we can because in this strategy it is not clearly written that...’ No. Our 
strategy is clear. No waste of time, no waste of resources. 
Regarding making the final decision when approaching clients Ewa Banasiuk states that she 
and her colleagues would never proceed with a client that sector head (Øivind Tønnessen) 
says no to, and that they respect his view as he represent the HQ and that this is natural. 
Marcin Prusak on the other hand finds that it depends on the size of the financing and the 
client: 
Well, you know I would say that it a little bit depend on size. Because obviously if it is 
large client and involves large financing client, you definitely need to call the guys in 
Oslo and ask what they think about it. If this is a smaller client and we know that it fits 
the strategy, and we went through the strategy a number of times from Oslo, we don’t 
always make a call, we just know that this client fits well to DNB. 
4.6.3	  ALIGNING	  PROCESSES	  TO	  DNB	  STANDARDS	  
DNB has an internal credit analysis paper, which is a template of about two pages, used for 
evaluation of companies and clients all over the DNB group. DNB Poland has historically not 
used this template. Øivind Tønnessen explains that this was a challenge in the beginning: 
In the beginning there was a tendency to write a lot of details, I think that the head of 
credits in Poland may want more detailed information into the credit papers, and we in 
HQ have a slightly different approach.. Keep the information short and say the most 
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important first and not loads of details. But lately it has gotten better and better, and 
that is clearly an improvement. 
David Palmér, who worked in Warsaw for three months, remarks that initially many credit 
papers were written in Polish and not in English, which made it more complex. He comments 
that the detail orientation might be because Poland is rather hierarchical, and that all 
responsibility was not delegated. The analysts included a lot of detailed information in credit 
papers because managers wanted to look at it themselves, rather than having it analyzed 
before it reached them. 
According to the interviewees there is a different career-path in DNB Poland than in DNB 
Stockholm and DNB Oslo, which affects how the work regarding credit papers is constituted. 
David Palmér observes: 
It was very mixed amongst the relationship managers, whether they had an 
understanding of credit risk or not. Many of them were very focused on selling, in 
Norway it is more based on that the relationship manager owns the credit risk and 
should have an understanding of what is regarded as acceptable structures and what is 
possible to do. It’s not always like that in Poland. 
It is identified by the interviewees that the quality of the credit papers requires improvement 
in Poland. The credit analysis needs to be more concise, critical, well thought through and 
straight to the point. Maria Skogeryd indicates that the many details in the credit paper might 
be from fear of missing something when the case is assigned to a higher decision level. She 
argues that this pattern sometimes also can be found in Sweden. 
Johan Sjögren, argues that there is an information asymmetry between Poland and Oslo and 
Stockholm in the credit analysis process. In Poland, he points out, there may be a need to 
balance a strong relationship unit with a more senior CAS [Credit analysts] unit, which is in 
line with current development in Norway and Sweden. Regarding information sharing and 
learning, Rokas Bancevičius analyst in Oslo, on the other hand, points out that the layout is 
the same on the credit papers due to the internal writing-system named the ‘pyramid 
principles’, and that employees in the same teams collaborate on establishing the credit 
papers. 
The Swedish interviewees comment that DNB Sweden was tied to the customer perspective 
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in the past, just like Poland is now. The sector focus has made the Swedish operations more 
tied to the Norwegian organizational set-up and the two ventures are well integrated today. 
The operations in Poland are holding a customer perspective, but are structurally organized 
similar to Norway and Sweden. Johan Sjögren argues that the expatriate in Poland, Alistair de 
Villiers, holds a balanced perspective of what works and not according to the strategy. 
According to Johan Sjögren, everyone in Poland is eager to do business, which to a large 
extent is a good thing but it is essential to have an understanding for DNB’s industry 
strategies and above all understand that DNB is a bank that values credit and risk handling. 
 
4.7 EXPATRIATE 
DNB Poland together with the DNB group assigned an expatriate from the HQ to work with 
the integration and communication between HQ and the subsidiary in Poland. This was an 
initiative made by DNB Poland. Adam Żelezik explains: 
We need someone who will help us to align with the group or make this closer contact 
with the right people. And we were looking at this specific person, and Alistair was the 
best candidate for this mission, and Artur agreed with Alistair that he joined the polish 
team for two years, or this mid-term period, and will help us much faster to become part 
of the group than if we will do it alone. 
It has been suggested in all the interviews that the expatriate has functioned as an integral link 
between HQ and DNB Poland. Johan Sjögren points out: ”it is his job to increase the activity 
and communication between Poland and both Sweden and Norway.” 
4.7.1	  BEFORE	  EXPATRIATE	  
The Polish employees have stated connecting with the right counterpart from another unit 
within DNB difficult. Szymon Adamczyk, having worked 9 years at DNB, comments: 
We didn’t have, we couldn’t identify contact persons. So you can imagine this 
inefficiency, that you are trying to call your colleague in the organization and you don’t 
know whom to approach, so it was like a ‘black hole’. 
The same confusion has been stated amongst Swedish and Norwegian employees, regarding 
whom to contact in Poland. Erik Engström argues: “Since Alistair came to Poland, the 
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operations have become more centralized [...] previously you weren’t always sure who you 
would get in contact with.” Johan Sjögren continues: “we can call Alistair to find out who the 
person in question is and what role they have. I don’t think our cooperation with Poland was 
that extensive before Alistair came to Poland.” 
4.7.2	  EXPATRIATE	  KEY	  IN	  ORGANIZATIONAL	  CHANGE	  	  
Anders Grevstad emphasizes the importance of the expatriate that he knows DNB’s strategy 
by heart and is very loyal both to Oslo and Poland. Peter Carlsson additionally states: 
He has done a remarkable job, and transmitted a lot of the DNB way of thinking, but he 
has also added an international perspective, since he is Scottish, and in that way got 
more perspectives on things. He is really an energetic guy that has helped us get 
through to the Polish market through his strong relations with the ‘mothership’  
Anders Grevstad states that the expatriate is key in the internal collaboration in DNB. Ewa 
Banasiuk reflects on his presence in Poland: 
I personally think it is positive, it’s great with new fresh air and also it makes the bond 
much stronger and then we kind of can find our place there and that we are not a 
completely separate unit that they only look at results and “ok, they are not really that 
good” and so, well just become an integral part. 
4.7.3	  INVOLVING	  DNB	  POLAND	  WITH	  THE	  GROUP	  
Adam Żelezik points out that the best way of sharing information about the Polish market is 
by being present, and accordingly employees from the HQ have been invited for gatherings, 
forums, sector conferences and client meetings. The interviewees emphasize that the 
communicational exchange between HQ and DNB Warsaw has increased. Weekly meetings, 
phone-calls, and increased integration by arranging more frequent face-to-face meetings has 
led to increased knowledge sharing of the DNB strategy and atmosphere. 
From a governance perspective on the relation between the parent bank and its subsidiary, it 
was emphasized that there are by-weekly visits from senior DNB staff in Poland as it is very 
important that the supervisory council and HQ are regularly updated and made aware of what 
risks and future plans Poland are or may be encountering. Szymon Adamczyk comments: 
 
Since we are a part of DNB, ‘we are DNB’. We need to understand the culture, the 
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Scandinavian and DNB culture. And in this case it is really important to have face-to-
face meetings. And to build trust between people. So we have been flying to Oslo, we 
have been inviting people from Oslo to Poland, to show them how banking sector looks 
like, who we are, how we are working. And also, after the takeover by DNB there was a 
large project to show the potential of the Polish market. 
Maria Skogeryd explains that the expatriate has been working hard with involving Poland in 
gatherings and meetings: 
I think people in Norway are positive towards doing new transactions in Poland. And it 
gives them a feeling of safety that they already know somebody in Poland, when they 
are building new relation and are doing transactions there. I really think Alistair has 
succeeded with his work and has put Poland on the map in a different way than it was 
before. He is incredibly driven and energetic. 
Both Alistair and Szymon Adamczyk suggest a way they handle the information asymmetry 
in using examples from the Norwegian market. For instance that Allegro in Poland is similar 
to Schibsted in Norway. This is in order to inform the counterpart in DNB what the client is 
like. Ulf Strandberg (Sweden) and Øivind Tønnessen (Norway) frequently participate in client 
meetings in Poland. Olga Plewicka, Relationship Manager in Warsaw, states that this adds 
value. Artur Tomaszewski explains that work is facilitated when they visit Poland, showing 
interest in the operations and the polish market. He comments: 
I hope it will change also across the organization because now of course everybody 
want to go to London and New York, maybe to Singapore, but Warsaw? No, not 
necessarily, not necessarily. But as people come here it changes. 
4.7.4	  VISIBILITY	  ON	  THE	  POLISH	  MARKET	  
DNB is a relatively small and niched corporate bank in Poland (Olof Seidel). Several 
interviewees indicate that DNB lacks recognition in Poland and the difficulty of being a small 
corporate bank in the Polish banking sector. Szymon Adamczyk states that companies were 
uncertain about the stability of the bank when it had been out for sale. He continues 
remarking: 
But right now it is changing. We are present in large transactions and we cooperate 
with many banks in the bank syndicates so it creates a lot of visibility of DNB on the 
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market. And when we started doing certain transactions and actually steal clients from 
other banks we have been more responsive, flexible and faster and it also created some 
visibility. 
Adam Żelezik confirms: “our targets know the DNB brand and the name DNB, what we are 
and what we do on the polish market, and this is enough I think and the brand recognition is 
not a problem anymore.” 
Olga finds that attention from HQ has increased significantly during the last years, with help 
from the expatriate in connecting Poland to people in Oslo: “Now we are in Poland and we 
are small, so we have to jump and say ‘here we are! Don’t forget about us!’ But I can 
understand that they sometimes are very busy.”  
Artur Tomaszewski describes that receiving salience from the shareholders is tough as well as 
convincing HQ to find time, resources and support for them. He states that on the business 
side immediate successes are more visible, but on the operations side it is not as 
straightforward, and subsequently more difficult to attract HQ’s attention. Artur Tomaszewski 
suggests: ”so therefore we are trying to knock to the doors of the Oslo office, to convince them 
that Poland is important for the group.” Szymon Adamczyk explains that it is not easy for 
several reasons getting a person from the HQ responsible for the Polish operations, because it 
means a lot of hard and additional work for the respective person and consequently that they 
have less time to work on their own home market portfolio. Artur Tomaszewski remarks a 
bias towards Poland. Many people regard Poland to be an underdeveloped market with a lot 
of risk. This affects the involvement received from Oslo. Artur Tomaszewski explains: “when 
the people started to come to Warsaw, see the clients, see the marketplace, see that it is ok, 
they get convinced. They buy in and they tend to return and they get involved.” 
David Palmér comments that working in Stockholm is almost like working at HQ, because it 
is close. This is the common understanding of the interviewees from the Stockholm office. 
Working on a deal in Poland that nobody feels responsible for in Oslo or Stockholm makes it 
difficult to get attention, he argues. The cases are smaller in Poland and maybe not always as 
profitable. It is natural that a larger effort is made on bigger deals, since they are more 
important for the groups’ results. Johan Sjögren remarks that Norwegians are more 
comfortable with having Sweden as a counterpart, since they are more familiar with the 
Swedish market, similar business culture, and the companies are well-known and they more 
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or less speak the same language: “We have been here for a while, and actually built up the 
trust”, he concludes. 
 
4.7.5	  KNOWLEDGE	  GAP	  	  
Many interviewees express that trust is an important aspect for the relationship between 
Poland and Oslo. Anders Grevstad comments: “corporate banking is a lot about getting to 
know people. You need to know who you can trust and not, and “who is all right and who is 
not?” Interviewees suggest that DNB had limited information about the Polish market in the 
beginning, with difficulties in determining if clients were good enough. Alistair de Villiers 
observes that there is a knowledge gap, and therefore it is important to build trust that goes 
both ways: "So it's been a lot about trying to market DNB internally, so this has been some of 
the key things in trying to address that challenge." Alistair de Villiers remarks that the trust 
and the knowledge sharing have increased during the last 2-3 years between HQ and DNB 
Poland, because of joint efforts from the different sector industries. Wojciech Dyk emphasizes 
the importance for employees in Poland to understand that DNB group should be used as a 
knowledge resource: 
Once people see it as an opportunity rather than a problem, I think it changes the 
approach, and then it becomes more about curiosity and thinking about how we can 
best leverage the knowledge, the know-how, the experience that we have and the 
relationships that we have on the group level, to succeed in Poland as well. And I think 
we are at this stage at the moment, but it was definitely not the case from the beginning. 
Knowledge gaps are suggested often being the reason for misunderstandings between the 
units. According to Magdalena Prusak there still is a discrepancy between the office in Poland 
and HQ regarding customers and transactions on the polish market.  
Several interviewees emphasize the significance of having an expatriate in Poland, convincing 
responsible people at HQ about particular transactions. Anne Hvistendahl from Norway 
confirms that Alistair de Villiers functions as a driving force to get credit papers and business 
proposals approved. Marcin Prusak argues: 
 
Ah. The first thing is that in order to collaborate properly with the guys in Oslo you 
need to have some sort of recognition and trust. And once we build the trust, 
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cooperation is just very good. But it takes time to build that trust. 
Marcin Prusak also argues that you need to be franc, modest and not present the situation in 
an excessively optimistic way. Regarding the information asymmetry between HQ the Polish 
market, Marcin Prusak comments: 
And in this way, that’s why the trust is so important. Because if they don’t trust you, 
how can you explain to them that this really works locally? Because they don’t know if 
it works or not, they don’t have access to all the details, they have never been here, they 
have not spent so many years here to observe the market. So they need to trust you. 
Otherwise, you would never convince people to approach a client, which is a little bit 
borderline. 
Eline Skramstad remarks that HQ trust Poland regarding their market situation, and that they, 
just like everybody else needs to discuss with the experts and the sector heads in specific 
issues. Marcin Prusak mentions that HQ often underlines this: “you are the local guys, you 
know locally how it works.” Tony Samuelson emphasizes that it takes time to build up and 
improve the collaboration: 
The collaboration works better and better. It is necessary in the beginning of this kind 
of strategies that people get to know each other. It is crucial that the Polish employees 
travel to Sweden and Norway, and also that the Norwegian employees travel locally, so 
that they get to know each other. It is a natural process that proceeds over time, and the 
more time you use the better the collaboration gets. 
Ulf Strandberg (Stockholm office) points out that trust decreases the friction between 
different sectors and units. A strong trust based relationship exists between Stockholm and 
Oslo, but perhaps there is still room for improvement in the trust relationship between Poland 
and Oslo. Johan Sjögren agrees and comments that when you are not familiar in working 
together, it is more natural to ask controlling questions. He finds that the bilateral 
communication is important and a major step to increase the trustworthiness for Poland. 
4.7.6	  SECONDMENT	  
DNB implemented a 1-3 month exchange opportunity for employees within DNB, referred as 
the “secondment”. The idea of the secondment was to encourage face-to-face meetings 
between employees, expand their networks, integrate the structures, build trust, create 
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visibility, and becoming more familiar with rating tools and financial analysis. Szymon 
Adamczyk explains: 
On certain parts it was about knowledge sharing. Educating in both ways about the 
Polish market and the Norwegian market, and also on the other hand it was to learn 
about and identify differences in our analytical tools.  
Most interviewees agree about having a positive view of the secondment. They argue that the 
secondment resulted in a larger understanding of each other’s competences by sharing 
knowledge and building trust. This makes it easier to proceed with transactions afterwards. 
Maria Skogeryd comments that the secondment was very valuable.  Poland gave her 
perspectives on DNB Sweden’s situation and on her own function and role at DNB. Some 
managers at DNB Stockholm do not fully agree. They state that the secondment has not been 
the best solution to align DNB employees. Arguments emphasized that the exchange needs to 
have a certain purpose and not just moving around employees. Including international 
employees in gatherings, meetings and discussions is regarded enough. 
4.7.7	  CULTURAL	  DIFFERENCES	  
Marcin Prusak emphasize a major challenge in the collaboration: 
Still, the culture issue is probably one of the biggest ones. Sometimes you know, people 
here locally just want to do business quickly, they want to have the answer the next day, 
whereas the people from HQ they want to first understand, and discuss, preferably 
meet, so it’s a little bit different pace of process I would say. 
He adds that it is important for new people in the bank to learn how to deal with ‘the guys in 
Oslo or Stockholm’, to build a good relation: “once you understand it and build good 
relations it’s ok. But probably this is kind of the major challenge.” 
Magdalena Prusak gives a more personal insight of how the difficult history of Poland has 
affected the mindset of the Polish population: 
I think that Polish people are generally very hard working; probably the difficult 
history of Poland has influenced us significantly. Partitions of Poland, which eliminated 
sovereign Poland for 123 years, and then communism taught people to count on 
themselves and to work hard to achieve something.  
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Øivind Tønnessen and Magdalena Prusak emphasize that Polish employees are very 
committed to work, that they will work all night to complete job assignments, eager to 
undertake new business. It is mentioned that the Norwegian work-mentality sometimes differ 
from this, and that it is not too common that employees from Poland can get hold of someone 
in Oslo after 5pm. 
4.7.8	  REPLACEMENT	  OF	  EXPATRIATE	  	  
Interviewees are skeptical toward the event that the expatriate from Norway would not be 
replaced with a successor. How it will turn out, depends on whether the bonds made so far 
between HQ and Poland are strong enough, they argue. Maria Skogeryd and Ewa Banasiuk 
points out that hopefully people have managed to grow their own networks, once Alistair has 
introduced them to a counterpart in Oslo.  
Erik Engström argues it to be necessary for a future successor of Alistair to have just as much 
strength in Norway and Sweden, as well as being able to use tools such as the DNB intranet 
and Lync. Johan Sjögren comments: I think it is important to have locally strong people, and I 
believe that there may be a need for an ‘outsider’ to continue at least for an additional time-
period, in order to continue to build the DNB culture. 
He adds that it would be positive for this person to be someone from who knows the DNB 
strategies well and can make sure they are properly followed throughout the industry sectors. 
Magda agrees that it is very valuable to have someone from the Group in Warsaw, and 
explains: “I think that having someone from the Group brings a lot of value to our 
organization and makes contact with other branches much easier. It also helps to understand 
point of views of both sides. 
Peter Carlsson on the other hand finds it to be more appropriate to assign the role to a polish 
employee: 
Of course he will be replaced, but I am not convinced whether this will be an 
international or Polish person. The best would be a Polish person, to be quite frank. 
Alistair has done a lot of the ‘ice-breaking’, so what remains now is to understand the 
Polish market. 
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5 ANALYSIS  
In the following chapter a comparison of the empirical findings with the theoretical 
framework will be presented and analyzed. The analysis will follow the same order as the 
theoretical framework presented above. First the narrow perspective of the agency theory will 
be introduced, followed by the broader agency theory perspective and the three additional 
factors: trust, attention and path dependency. This chapter will round off with an introduction 
of a revised theoretical framework, representing the contribution to theory of this thesis. 
5.1 AGENCY THEORY 
The empirical material indicates that DNB’s subsidiary in Poland is granted authority to act in 
its owner’s name and is delegated work from the HQ in Oslo as well as the branch Stockholm. 
This implies that the relationship between them can be viewed from the agency theory 
perspective (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
Implied by agency theory, the principal and the agent may have different objectives and 
preferences, which imply that individuals make rational choices that maximize their own 
utility. This suggest that the subsidiary of Poland always would make choices to maximize its 
own utility, whereas HQ is trying to align Poland to their goals. Agency theory argues that 
there exists goal incongruence between the two units (Tasoluk et al., 2006). The most 
common perception in the empirical material is that there does exist goal congruence, since 
the goals and the strategy is clear even though the processes are not fully aligned. The 
empirical material does not indicate that DNB Poland is working to maximize its own utility. 
It could be argued that this was not always the case historically during the reorganizations and 
change of banking profile, but today the empirical data indicate eagerness from the polish 
employees to learn from DNB and become more co-aligned with the HQ. Critique towards 
agency theory imply that it is not only goal congruence that is of interest whilst studying the 
relationship between subsidiary and HQ, but also additional factors. 
 
To conclude, it seems beneficial to view the relationship between HQ and Poland from the 
agency perspective, but it is also indicated that more aspects within the agency theory need to 
be taken into consideration.  
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5.1.1	  INFORMATION	  ASYMMETRY	  
An information asymmetry is suggested by the empirical data to exist, as the employees in 
Poland have a larger understanding and knowledge about the Polish market in comparison to 
their colleagues in Norway and Sweden. Due to the fact that the intraorganizational 
relationship in this context have lasted during a relatively short time-period, the three ventures 
have not yet had time to become co-aligned with the HQ’s incentives. DNB Poland is 
secluded from the DNB intranet, has limited access to contact lists that hinders the email 
exchange and information sharing across the group. The empirical data further indicate a 
discrepancy that DNB Poland varies from DNB Sweden and DNB Norway in their work 
processes, and there is consensus that the Polish credit papers and communication patterns are 
not fully aligned. The empirical material also suggests that HQ has limited insight in the 
Polish subsidiary since it has its own balance sheet. The fact that DNB Poland does not have 
full access to all information existing at HQ, makes it more difficult for information to be 
shared. Moreover, it is essential to underline that there is an asymmetry in governmental 
regulations between Norway and Poland. The empirical material indicates that the PFSA is a 
demanding financial regulator requesting time-consuming reporting, which makes DNB 
Poland rather inflexible. As DNB Norway is not exposed to the same regulatory setting, it 
could be argued to be difficult for them to have full understanding of this. 
 
The broader stream of agency theory, taking into account the ‘social and contextual’ factors, 
find that monitoring and control is not always the best way to solve the agency problem, 
where HQ in this case wants to align Poland to its goals. These authors argue instead that the 
root cause of the agency problem is the subsidiary’s lack of understanding of what is expected 
from them, the desires of HQ, and the means to reach them. This information asymmetry can 
be reduced through joint cooperative efforts and by integrating the communication channels, 
as suggested by theory. It is proposed by the interviewees that it is important that there exists 
a mutual understanding that both of the parties can generate knowledge to one another. The 
DNB group has begun to reduce the information asymmetry by communicating through the 
common tongue for DNB; the ‘Pyramid Principles’, as well as including DNB Poland to the 
DNB credit analysis template. The employees in Poland present arguments to emphasize the 
importance of receiving feedback and approval of the credit papers from the sector heads in 
Oslo respectively Stockholm. As suggested by theory, information systems can be used in 
order to control the problem of hidden information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The organizational 
structure in the Polish subsidiary has been organized similarly to the same set-up in HQ and 
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this has increased the integration between the two. As a consequence to this, also the 
collaboration has increased, and has reduced the information asymmetry. 
 
By decreasing information asymmetry goal congruence should be achievable. The empirical 
data imply that it is improving but it takes time to completely delimit information asymmetry 
and to achieve goal congruence. Shapiro (2005) argues that relationships are sustained over 
time and the principal and the agent will eventually learn about each other. Furthermore 
theory states that a long-term relationship can reduce the information asymmetry because the 
incentives will become co-aligned and the principal will get a more complete assessment of 
the performance of the agent. By including DNB Poland to the DNB standards and aligning 
the organizational structures, a larger understanding and communicational exchange has 
begun to take place and therefore an improvement of the relationship between HQ and its 
subsidiary has been identified. 
 
To conclude, the empirical material suggests coherence with the theoretical framework 
regarding information asymmetry. Increased communication and integration affect the 
information asymmetry positively. Decreasing or increasing information asymmetry directly 
affects goal congruence and by this it affects the subsidiary-HQ relationship.  
	  
5.1.2	  RISK	  	  
Due to the contextual difference between the subsidiary being in a challenger position, and 
HQ being in market leading position, a contradiction how to approach clients has been 
highlighted in the empirical material. What has been observed in the empirical material is that 
it is frequently argued that HQ is more risk averse and more prudent when it comes to credit 
and risk. At HQ, relationship managers are responsible for the risk, but in Poland the 
relationship managers tend to function more as salesmen – eager to approach clients, improve 
their portfolio and grow. It could be argued that this makes the subsidiary less averse to risk, 
as suggested by theory. It has been stated by certain interviewees that it is essential to 
maintain credibility and trustworthiness in this process avoiding the risk of generating a too 
positive perception. The organizational structure in DNB Poland is aligned to HQ but not 100 
percent because the relationship managers and credit analysts are working more separately in 
Poland, in comparison to the HQ. This is identified to add complexity to the information 
sharing, communicational exchange, collaboration and integration.   
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The narrow agency perspective assumes that the agent will act in its own interest, in a manner 
that can be harmful for the principal. As theory underlines, “after all, it is not their money 
they are risking”. The empirical material imply that the risk of the Polish employees working 
against the goals of HQ is decreased by the implementation of KPI’s, balance scorecards and 
the clear industry strategies for the corporate banking operations, whereby the goal awareness 
is being spread and cascaded down to each department. This implies that DNB employees in 
Poland are starting to act in the interest of the HQ. The empirical material additionally 
indicate that the polish subsidiary’s level of trust towards DNB has increased due to more 
long-term strategies and further imply willingness to work according to the HQ’s objectives.  
 
The theory suggest two reasons as to why the managers would not completely align the 
subsidiary’s activities towards the goals of the HQ. The first one is that economic incentives 
are misaligned, and the second one that the goals of the subsidiary and the HQ differ. In this 
case, the first alternative seems most applicable. In this case it is suggested that economic 
incentives make the subsidiary take more risk than the HQ desires. This would be a possible 
explanation as to why Polish relationship managers are more eager to grow the portfolio. The 
second alternative does not seem applicable as interviewees in Poland state that they 
nowadays clearly know the goal of the organization, especially after becoming part of the 
Northern Europe division.  
To conclude, the empirical data indicates that the subsidiary and HQ have different risk 
preferences. The misalignment can be considered to be necessary due to the different markets 
context that exists in Norway and Poland. DNB’s implementation of KPI’s, balance 
scorecards and clear strategies can indicate that the goal congruence has improved but is not 
fully accomplished. Different risk preferences can be argued to have a negative correlation 
with goal congruence; thereby risk is a factor that affects the relationship. 
	  
5.1.3	  CONTROL	  
Theory indicates that differences in key organizational characteristics can make it more 
difficult to monitor and control and these differences in turn will aggravate the effective 
communication and knowledge sharing between the units. The empirical material suggests 
that some key organizational characteristics are different in the Polish subsidiary, such as 
holding a more detail-oriented mindset and hierarchical business culture, as well as its 
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historical background. Thus, the different key organizational characteristics can be implied to 
complicate the monitoring and control by the principal.  
 
The problem of ’dysfunctional variation’ can be identified in the empirical material. The 
process and the maintenance of aligning MNCs to work towards the same goals set by the 
owners of the organization needs controlling, according to Haberstroh (1965). Theory 
suggests two ways for the principal to control that the agent is not operating in its own 
interest; ‘direct control’ and ‘outcome-based contracts’. From the empirical data it can be 
concluded that the HQ has got several ways of ’direct’ controlling the operations in Poland 
(Andersson et al., 2005). For instance, all strategic objectives need to be approved by the HQ, 
the template for credit papers is prepared by HQ, and representatives from the senior advisory 
by-weekly visit DNB Poland to receive market updates and control the Polish operations. The 
theory suggest that this type of direct control can be hampering since the HQ does not have 
full understanding of the local business environment, which in turn can lead to controlling in 
an unbeneficial way. As stated by several interviewees, this has on the contrary been an 
opportunity for knowledge sharing, intraorganizational interaction and co-alignment. 
Furthermore, the interviewees indicate that they trust the Polish employees to have a better 
understanding of their local market and in turn, this can support the improvement of the 
collaboration between HQ and its subsidiary. 
 
The theory further suggests that ‘outcome-based contracts’ can evaluate the subsidiary's 
performance by financial performance measures and the empirical data confirms that this is 
the case. The empirical data suggest the KPI’s and the balanced scorecards is a way for Polish 
employees to know what is expected from them and to understand the goals of the group. The 
empirical findings indicate that control has had a positive effect on the collaboration and 
integration because employees in Poland utilize meetings as a knowledge exchange, 
increasing their understanding on how to reach goal congruence.  
 
The expatriate in place in Poland and the intraorganizational projects such as the secondment 
has the aim to develop the Polish employees understanding towards DNB, as desired by the 
HQ. The theory suggest that using corporate level expatriates can cause the local relationships 
of the subsidiary to become shallow, as this type of placements mostly have a limited duration 
and focus will be on activities that are easier to learn and understand. The empirical material 
suggest the contrary, that it has been most beneficial to have an expatriate placed in Poland, 
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and during the time that he has been present in Poland, the integration, communicational 
exchange and corporate alignment has increased.  
 
To conclude, DNB Poland is working towards a co-alignment with the HQ, the principal, in 
accordance to what is suggested by agency theory. The monitoring and control is visible in 
the empirical data, as well as integrating the desires of the HQ to reach a co-alignment and 
improve the relationship between subsidiary and HQ. Control seems to be positively 
correlated with goal congruence, affecting the relationship beneficially.  
 
5.1.4	  ORGANIZATIONAL	  CULTURE	  
Meyer et al. (2011) explain that there is a need to balance the subsidiary’s local identity, the 
‘external embeddedness’, with the subsidiary’s strategic role within the MNC, the ‘internal 
embeddedness’. It is suggested that the business culture at DNB Poland historically has been 
unfamiliar with the Scandinavian business culture and holds a more hierarchical and detail 
oriented approach, compared to DNB Sweden and DNB Norway. Furthermore the 
interviewees suggest that the Swedish and Norwegian business cultures are more co-aligned, 
arguably due to a long-term collaboration and both being Scandinavian countries. These 
cultural differences or ‘internal embeddedness’ is suggested by theory to make it complex in 
combining Poland’s strategic role with the MNC. The empirical material points out that many 
differences needs to be explained and understood in order to integrate the three ventures. 
DNB Poland has previously not been used to the HQ’s business procedures, information 
networks (such as Pyramid Principals) and Scandinavian customer preferences. The Polish 
market is characterized of being locally embedded and the empirical material suggests that it 
is difficult to entirely emerge from this business culture and adapt to DNB and the 
Scandinavian culture.  
 
The empirical material underlines the significance of different market contexts. With a lower 
market share and lack of recognition, DNB is struggling on the Polish market. The 
interviewees suggest that being a challenger is completely different from being dominant on 
the market. This goes hand in hand with the ‘external embeddedness’ suggested by theory. 
The interviewees suggest that it is essential to honor the individuality of the local environment 
when implementing new strategies, in correspondence with theory. The broader perspective 
of the agency theory enlightens environmental factors, but the empirical data emphasize 
specifically that the market context has a great significance, that is not completely captured 
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within the theory. The empirical material states that it is vital for MNC’s to understand that 
different market contexts are characterized by local customer behaviors, culture, laws and 
regulations. It can thereby be implied that HQ in this case is lacking knowledge about the 
Polish market in order to set up appropriate goals for its subsidiary that are achievable.  
 
Moreover, there is a strong consensus in the empirical material about the positive aspect of 
having an expatriate positioned locally in Poland, who understands the differing market 
contexts, the DNB strategy and the different cultures. This is exactly what Hofstede (1991) in 
theory refers to as ’corporate diplomats’ that are necessary to make multinational structures 
work, functioning as an intermediary between the various ventures. According to Lewis 
(2006), the international manager who is unaware of different cultural behaviors will find it 
most difficult to motivate and cooperate with the foreign staff and managers.  The empirical 
material indicate that the expatriate have functioned as a link to build bridges within DNB, 
enlightening the three ventures, creating a better understanding about the cultural differences 
and increased communication, collaboration and integration between them.  
The empirical material suggests that persons that are key to the relationship, such as 
expatriates, arguably restrict the agency problem raised by the organizational cultural 
differences. According to this it can be stated that differences in organizational culture has a 
negative correlation with goal achievement. These persons should be additionally highlighted 
in the literature than what is suggested by Hoenen and Kostova (2015). 
 
To conclude, both internal and external embeddedness makes it more complex to handle the 
relationship and to achieve the goals set by a general DNB strategy. The different market 
contexts, and persons that are key to the relationships within organizations, have a great 
significance in the empirical material, and we suggest this to have larger recognition in the 
broader view of the agency theory. It can be argued that differences in organizational culture 
elevates the agency problem, and therefore organizational culture affects the subsidiary-HQ 
relationship by making the goals of the organization more difficult to achieve. 
	  
5.1.5	  TRUST	  
The Polish interviewees find the goal and the strategy to be clear, but there seems to exist a 
discrepancy in how the Polish employees are working towards reaching these goals and to 
what the HQ expects. This discrepancy can be connected to the theory of means incongruence 
established by Tasoluk et al. (2006), where different local contexts and a lack of trust in each 
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other’s capabilities is claimed to be the major reason for the incongruence in the means of 
working towards the same goals (Tasoluk et al., 2006). For instance, it has been suggested 
that the industry sectors sometimes do not agree upon which clients to approach to reach the 
set goals and targets. This could be due to the different and much more competitive context 
that DNB Poland is working within, and as mentioned by the empirical material, a lack of 
personal contact previously between the subsidiary and HQ, resulting in lack of trust in each 
other’s capabilities.  
 
Trust is frequently commented upon in the empirical data. Especially it is stated that corporate 
banking is a lot about knowing your colleagues and who to cooperate with and not. 
Employees in DNB Poland argue that the interaction increases over time with HQ and also 
the level of trust once having met people face-to-face instead of simply sending e-mails. It is 
argued that the personal contact has increased between HQ and the subsidiary, just as theory 
implies to be very important for high-trust relationships (Beccerra & Gupta, 1999). This 
personal contact consequently encourages collaboration and integration between the three 
ventures, and subsequently the Polish employees become more committed to the goals of the 
HQ. 
 
The majority of the interviewees underline the importance of the Polish CEO and CFO’s 
engagement and future belief in DNB in that they have remained at the company during all 
the historical reorganizations. This is in turn stated to be increasing the trust and engagement 
of the employees. This is brought up in the theory of Kim and Mauborgne (1993), stating the 
importance of foreign subsidiary managers to be engaged in the organization and to be 
committed to its goals. Several desirable social effects such as individual and group 
performance, commitment, cooperation and conflict handling are suggested to improve if 
commitment is shown by managers and by that trust is gained (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). On 
the other hand, the HQ’s lack of commitment and trust in the operations shown historically 
when the Polish venture was out for sale can be argued as having negatively affected the trust 
within the relationship.  
To conclude, the empirical data suggests that trust is a key factor to the relationship between 
HQ and subsidiary as well as the goal commitment. Personal contact and managerial 
commitment can be argued to build trust and further increase the commitment between the 
subsidiary and the HQ. 
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5.1.6	  ATTENTION	  
From the empirical material it is obvious that the Polish employees find the attention from the 
HQ to be vital, as a way of leveraging knowledge that already exist internally in the 
organization. It is also stated that attention has been almost non-existing historically. This 
could be considered natural as the DNB corporate and retail units were up for sale at the time. 
When decided to keep the Polish corporate banking unit within DNB, the attention started to 
increase due to increased communication and integration the organizational structures of the 
ventures. It was not until the expatriate came to Poland that the Polish subsidiary began to 
gain attention, it is argued. Integrating the Polish venture into the Northern Europe division 
has been stated to give Poland more attention, and the empirical material indicate that they 
now are and feel more part of the group. Attention and legitimacy from the HQ, is stated by 
the theory to be vital for the subsidiary performance. In agreement to theory, attention and 
legitimacy is important for the subsidiary to gain knowledge that is spread out in the 
organization.  
 
To conclude, by increasing the integration and communication more knowledge has been 
shared from the HQ, and subsequently the subsidiary has gained more attention and a better 
understanding of the ways to achieve the goals of the HQ. 
	  
5.1.7	  PATH	  DEPENDENCY	  
From the empirical material it is clear that DNB Poland to a high extent is affected by 
historical internal events, such as originating from a joint venture, acquiring a large retail 
bank as well as having large reorganizations and changes in the strategic directives. Theory 
suggests that it is essential to understand the long-term implications of the agency theory 
performance outcome. Vergne and Durand (2010) describe the phenomena of path 
dependency as created by a lock-in due to former decisions the organization has made, which 
in turn creates inflexibility. This can clearly be illustrated in the empirical material as DNB 
Poland is ‘marked’ by carrying a legacy of a portfolio that partly lies outside the DNB 
corporate banking industry-focused strategies, due to decisions made in the past. It could be 
argued that the memories from the time when DNB was part of the joint venture, describing it 
as: “it was like having two mothers, but neither one cared for us” still influences the 
employees in DNB today. Due to this lock-in caused by the past, the alignment with HQ has 
been affected negatively. The perception was that Poland did not receive much attention, 
communicational exchange or integration with HQ during the joint venture era.  
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The theory implies that firms cannot overlook its past, which makes it hard for the firm to 
fundamentally change its operations and routines. As suggested in the empirical material, 
adapting to changes takes time, and this is also the case when becoming accustomed to new 
strategies and structures. The empirical material indicates that the history of DNB Poland, its 
path dependency, can be considered to affect all of the above-presented factors. It increased 
the information asymmetry, as it could be argued that the HQ lacked effort and care for the 
Polish venture until it became clear that the Polish banking operations were not going to be 
sold. Path dependency has further increased the differences in risk preferences, as DNB 
Poland previously did not have the same LCI industry-focused strategies as the rest of the 
group. The HQ’s control over the subsidiary has been affected by path dependency as well. It 
is suggested to be more difficult for the HQ to control its subsidiary because of the wide 
spread in strategy to enable improvement of the portfolio and due to the historically differing 
organizational structures between the two ventures. Further, the organizational culture is 
affected, because the integration and networking between the Polish subsidiary and HQ has 
only recently begun to be established properly. As mentioned, the joint venture gave the 
Polish subsidiary little attention from HQ and it could be argued that there is a financial 
aspect to the joint venture as well that limited the attention given from HQ. Due to the same 
reason, that integration, communication and collaboration had not begun until recently, trust 
has not had time to be built-up between the ventures, yet.  
 
To conclude, DNB Poland is an example of a lock-in where the historical development and 
former decisions have set boundaries and limits on the subsidiary’s operations today. Path 
dependency has affected the relationship between DNB Poland and HQ in a longitudinal way, 
and above all it has influenced all of the above-mentioned factors. This implies path 
dependency to be an embedding factor that has an extensive influence indirectly and directly 
on the subsidiary-HQ relationship. 
5.1.8	  CONCLUDING	  THE	  ANALYSIS	  
DNB Poland is working towards a co-alignment with the HQ, the principal, in accordance to 
what is suggested by both the narrower stream and broader stream of agency theory. The 
empirical case study, examining the relationship between DNB’s subsidiary in Poland and its 
HQ, identified that information asymmetry, risk and control were indicated to affect whether 
goal congruence will be reached. DNB’s implementation of KPI’s, balanced scorecards and 
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clear strategies indicated that the goal congruence has improved but is not fully accomplished. 
The most common perception in the empirical material is that goal congruence has been 
reached because the goals and the strategy is clear, but this is contradictory since all 
information systems and working processes are not fully aligned. The agency problem can be 
reduced by control and in this thesis we find that control is positive to a certain extent and in 
this case control is being used as a source of knowledge exchange to reach goal congruence. 
Due to the different market contexts that the three ventures are operating in; a difference in 
risk preferences and a lack of mutual understanding for one another has been identified.  
 
Arguably, not only goal congruence affect the relationship within an MNC, but a wider 
perspective with other factors including the subsidiary’s perspective also needs to be taken 
into consideration. Therefore, the specific unit of analysis in this thesis; the subsidiary-HQ 
relationship, was furthermore argued to be successfully viewed from Hoenen and Kostova’s 
(2015) broader agency perspective. This is because the additional social and contextual 
factors suggested by Hoenen and Kosova (2015), named ‘organizational culture’ were 
confirmed to be affecting the goal achievement of the subsidiary and in turn affect the 
relationship. DNB is in a market leading position in Norway but a challenger in Poland and 
Sweden and a difference regarding the financial regulatory setting has been identified. The 
different market contexts are outlined to be notably important in the empirical material and 
indicate that the market context has a greater significance than stated by theory. Both internal 
and external embeddedness make it more complex to handle the relationship and for a 
subsidiary to align to a general DNB strategy. It can be argued that differences in 
organizational culture elevates the agency problem, and therefore organizational culture 
affects the subsidiary-HQ relationship by making the goals of the organization more difficult 
to achieve. Furthermore the empirical data indicate that persons that are key to the 
organization will improve the relationship between the ventures by increasing 
communication, integration and collaboration. To highlight the importance of expatriates and 
key persons who understands the different ventures markets and business cultures has been 
declared influential by both theory and the empirical data and we suggest this to be significant 
when studying the relationship between subsidiary and HQ.  
 
Moreover, we suggest an extension of the broader agency perspective, which focus on 
embedding factors such as path dependency, as well as additional social factors; trust and 
attention. This extensional agency perspective needs to be taken into account when studying 
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the affecting factors of a subsidiary-HQ relationship to enable further perspectives on how the 
subsidiary is committed to and can achieve the goals. The empirical data suggests that trust is 
a key factor to improve the relationship between HQ and subsidiary because increased 
personal contact and managerial commitment was argued to improve trust and further 
increase the goal commitment between the subsidiary and the HQ. Trust was also argued to be 
a beneficial complement to monitoring and control. Attention was argued vital for the survival 
of the subsidiary to grow an understanding in how to achieve the goals set up by HQ. By 
increasing the integration and communication more knowledge has been shared from the HQ, 
and subsequently the subsidiary has gained more attention and a better understanding of the 
ways to achieve the goals of the HQ.  
DNB Poland is an example of a lock-in where the historical development and former 
decisions have set boundaries and limits on the subsidiary’s operations today. Path 
dependency has affected the relationship between DNB Poland and HQ in a longitudinal way, 
and above all it has influenced all of the above-mentioned factors. This implies path 
dependency to be an embedding factor that has an extensive influence indirectly and directly 
on the subsidiary-HQ relationship. 	    
Influential Factors within MNCs	   	   Ahlberg & Lindesvärd	  
	   74	  
5.2 REVISED THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
In Figure 3 below, the revised theoretical framework is illustrated. Six factors: information 
asymmetry, risk, control, organizational culture, trust, attention affect three different aspects 
of the subsidiary-HQ relationship: goal congruence, goal achievement and goal commitment, 
in a direct or indirect manner. Information asymmetry, risk and control affect the goal 
congruence. Organizational culture and attention affect the goal achievement. Trust affects 
the goal commitment. Path dependency affects all three aspects of the relationship, as well as 
all the factors, as it is regarded to be a longitudinal and embedding factor. Moreover, goal 
congruence, goal achievement and goal commitment are aspects of the relationship between 
subsidiary and HQ.  
 
 
Figure 3, Revised Theoretical Framework  
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6 RESULTS 
The factors identified to affect the relationship between subsidiary and HQ when trying to 
align the HQ’s goals with the subsidiary, are information asymmetry, risk, control, 
organizational culture, path dependency, trust and attention. The factors were identified to 
affect different aspects of the relationship between the subsidiary and HQ. These aspects were 
in addition to the already established goal congruence, identified to additionally include goal 
achievement and goal commitment.  
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7 CONCLUSION  
This thesis has focused on the area of MNCs within the area of business studies and in 
particular it looked closer at the relationship between headquarters and subsidiaries. In 
studying this relationship from an agency perspective the thesis followed earlier research in 
this area, but importantly it took the literature a step further as it introduced three new 
variables to this context. In the following chapter, a conclusion of the findings is presented. 
 
In this thesis the subsidiary-HQ relationship was applied to an agency perspective, and it was 
also argued why this is beneficial. It was indicated that more aspects within the agency theory 
should be taken into consideration than what is suggested by the traditional narrower stream 
of agency theory.  
 
The empirical case study, examining the relationship between DNB’s subsidiary in Poland 
and its HQ, identified that information asymmetry, risk and control were indicated to affect 
whether goal congruence will be reached, and by that it was argued that these factors affect 
the subsidiary-HQ relationship. 
 
It was furthermore suggested that not only goal congruence is an important aspect of the 
relationship within an MNC, but that the subsidiary’s perspective also needs to be taken into 
consideration. Therefore, the subsidiary-HQ relationship from Hoenen and Kostova’s (2015) 
broader agency perspective was proved as a successful application. The additional social and 
contextual factors suggested by Hoenen and Kosova (2015) named ‘organizational culture’ in 
this thesis, were confirmed to be affecting the goal achievement of the subsidiary, and by that 
it was argued to affect the subsidiary-HQ relationship. The different market contexts were 
argued to be of great significance for the relationship, as well as it was proved important to 
have persons within the organization that understand both cultures, functioning as mediators. 
It was suggested that these should have larger recognition than what was indicated by theory. 
 
Moreover and most importantly, an extension of the broader agency perspective was 
suggested, where the factors argued to be affecting the subsidiary-HQ relationship were path 
dependency, trust and attention. An extension of the agency perspective it was argued is 
needed since it enables further perspectives on the agency problem and how to solve it, not 
only the perspective of the HQ and the goal congruence. Goal achievement and goal 
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commitment were proved to be important aspects of the subsidiary-HQ relationship as well. 
We showed that further adding complementary social and contextual perspectives to the 
agency perspective can be highly enriching, just as suggested by various scholars (Eisenhardt, 
1989, Hoenen & Kostova, 2015).   
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8 DISCUSSION  
In studying the subsidiary-HQ relationship from an agency perspective this thesis has 
followed earlier research in the area, but importantly it has taken the literature a step further 
as it introduced three new variables that have never before been added to this context. What 
these three additional factors; path dependency, trust and attention, mean in a broader context 
and how they can generate new research questions is further discussed below. Firstly, a 
paragraph discussing the consequences of delimitations made in the thesis is presented. 
 
Due to the delimitations and methodological choices made in this thesis several areas of 
interest were not within the scope of this study. For instance, the basis for economic 
incentives within DNB was not taken into consideration. As economic incentives is an 
important tool for aligning the subsidiaries’ and its employees’ interests with the strategy 
from HQ, this delimitation generate consequences. It was implied in the analysis that a 
misalignment in the economic incentives can be one reason as to why DNB’s subsidiary has 
an interest of approaching clients, even though the client may be out of the general DNB 
strategy. To provide further understanding of how the economic incentives are established in 
Poland, Norway and Sweden could have given an implication of compensation bases, and if 
they differed between the ventures, it could be proved whether they were the cause for 
misalignment of interests and goals. To further compare if the misalignment was due to the 
fact that the Polish market is more competitive, or due to misleading economic incentives 
could be of further interest.  
 
Regarding further research, it would first of all be of uttermost relevance to do a similar case 
study on a different MNC to see if the same factors would unfold or if further elements would 
prove to affect the relationship between HQ and its subsidiary. A practical relevance of this 
thesis for DNB and other MNC’s is to recognize that every venture within an MNC has its 
own unique history, which will affect the relationship and the ventures’ alignment towards the 
general strategy within the group accordingly. Many decisions are made within MNC’s every 
day, which may have wider implications than first accounted for. The choice to enter a joint 
venture and acquiring another bank in Poland resulted in lock-ins for DNB’s venture in 
Poland, causing it to have difficulties to act in a flexible manner when suddenly the strategy 
and the direction of the unit is decided from top management to change. To conclude the 
discussion of the importance of path dependency, it is essential for every organization to take 
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into consideration its own and its ventures’ unique history. This historical ‘backpack’ can 
either offer opportunities or constraints, why careful considerations of strategic decisions 
needs to be made, and likely consequences of them in the future since it apparently affects the 
relationship between HQ and its subsidiary more than maybe first anticipated. In the case of 
DNB Poland, path dependency has had negative consequences but it is interesting to speculate 
whether DNB in Norway on the contrary has had a positive path dependency and due to this 
holds a market leading position today.  
 
When it comes to the practical relevance for trust within MNC relationships, it seems to be 
important to recognize that trust is gained over time. For trust to be established, and especially 
to work as a control mechanism instead of applying monitoring and direct control, personal 
contact and familiarity needs to take place. If no trust exist in a relationship between HQ and 
the subsidiary, it can seem very likely that the costs for monitoring, controlling, and the 
justification for decisions etcetera would be a lot more extensive than what it costs to build 
trust through incorporating face-to-face meetings and visits across units. It may seem abstract 
to measure the level of trust in an objective manner since trust can be regarded to be very 
subjective. If possible, it would be interesting for future research to measure the cost of 
establishing and maintaining a trust relationship, as opposed to what the costs for direct 
monitoring and control are.  
 
Roth and O´Donnell (1996) suggest that expatriates can affect the agency problem and goal 
congruence and the empirical findings in this thesis indicate that persons that are key to the 
organization, (the expatriate among others) are influencing the relationship between HQ and 
its subsidiary. To research further how much an expatriate influence the relationship and its 
significance for the intraorganizational relationship, as well as closer investigating the internal 
managerial rotation that is taking place in the studied context as well as it is suggested by 
theory, would be of utter interest.  
 
Attention is a limited resource and the HQ strategically decides how to distribute this 
resource. For a subsidiary to feel valuable and belonging to the MNC, attention was proved 
vital in the empirical material. One can speculate whether the HQ are aware of how scares 
and sought after attention is for a subsidiary, as suggested by theory, or not. A suggestion for 
further research would be to provide further understanding about what is defined as attention, 
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and to establish a common definition of it to clearly see if attention is argued to be equally 
important from both the HQ’s and subsidiary’s perspective.  
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10 APPENDIX  
10.1 APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SUBSIDIARY 
 
Introducing background questions 
• Please tell us how long you have worked for DNB and what your position is? 
• Have you previously had any other position within DNB? Or background before 
DNB? 
Motivation  
• What is motivation to you?  
• What motivates you at DNB?  
• There are many banks in Poland and the market is characterized by high competition, 
why is DNB your choice of employer?  
Leadership  
• How would you define a good leader?  
• What characterizes the leaders that you have had within DNB?  
Leadership and change in owner and structure: Reorganizations  
• Please tell us how DNBs past few years with reorganizations has affected you and 
your work/position?  
• Have you had leaders from both DNB Poland and DNB Norway/Sweden? 
• What were the differences in leadership, if any?  
DNB Poland as subsidiary to DNB  
• What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about the collaboration 
between DNB Poland and DNB Norway? 
• Why? 
Strategy & Goals 
• From your perspective what is DNB Strategy in Poland? What is your view of the 
present strategy for DNB Polska? 
• What are the main goals for DNB Poland?  
• What challenges do you encounter working to achieve these goals? 
• Mayor challenges in the restructuring 
• Clear directives from Norway and top management, how do you handle this situation? 
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• Recognize contributions – team spirit? 
Control (an aspect of the relationship of the corporate versus subsidiary) 
• You work closely to the Polish Market and have good contact with clients and 
companies in Poland. How does the information sharing work in practice with head 
office? 
• In what way does the headquarters in Norway make sure that you are on the same 
track? (Regarding the way you work/strategies) 
• Do you report directly to the headquarters? 
• If yes, how often? How detailed should they be? 
• Does the headquarters send employees from there to DnB Polska to make sure you 
work according to their strategy/way of working? 
The exchange program 
• Have you been to the headquarters in this purpose? 
• Can you describe the “procedure”? 
• On what basis is this decision made on who should go there? 
• Expectations? 
Incentives 
• When someone closes a good deal with a client, how is that published (and maybe 
celebrated) internally? 
• Are you compensated by performance? (Reward system? Bonuses?) 
• How bonus driven is the organization? 
Decision-making 
• What are the corporate characterizing features that you select upon when approaching 
potential customer? 
• Who makes the final decision whether you will or will not approach this potential new 
client? 
• When do you call the Sector Head’s in Norway or Sweden? 
• What is normally the reason to your different opinions? why do you think differently? 
• Which factors is it (most frequently) that is the reason for you and Norway thinking 
differently? 
• How does this hold you back? (Hinder and make you feel limited?) 
• How often can you take own initiatives? 
• How often does this occur? 
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• How does this motivate you? 
Future 
• What is your thoughts on the future on DNB Poland? 
• Do you consider the future as secure or unsecure? 
• Do you believe DNB will gain market shares or loose market shares in Poland?  
 
10.2 APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR 
EMPLOYEES IN DNB STOCKHOLM  
 
Introduction 
• What is your position and background? 
• What motivates you to work for DNB? 
Relations 
• Can you describe how the relationship between DNB Norway and Sweden looks, 
structurally? 
• Can you describe how the relationship looks in the daily operations?  
• How do you notice the relationship with HQ in Norway in your daily work? 
• Do you have frequent contact with the HQ?  
• Has this always been the case? 
Secondment 
• Can you please describe the ‘secondment’ and what it is for? 
• What are your thought upon it? 
Control 
• How does the HQ make sure you work towards the same goals? 
• Are there any controlling mechanisms from Norway?  
• Has the HQ sent any ‘expatriates’ to the Stockholm office? 
•  
Collaboration 
• What do you think about the collaboration with Poland?  
• Are there any differences from the relationship with Norway?  
Strategy 
• What is the strategy for DNB Sweden? 
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• What is your thoughts on this? 
• There have been some structural changes within the branch in Sweden, how do you 
think you have handled these? 
• How do you handle new clients on the Swedish market, who has the last word of say? 
Risk 
• To what level do you think that there is trust established between the HQ and the 
branch in Stockholm? 
• Has this always been the case? 
Future 
• What is your thoughts on the future on DNB? In Sweden respectively on Poland? 
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10.3 APPENDIX C – ARTICLE 
DN Dagens Næringsliv 
By Marit Halvorsen June 3. 2015 
A Brighter Future is a Fact in Poland  
  
Even though it has been a 
bumpy ride, a brighter future of 
the Polish venture is a fact. The 
Norwegian bank DNB has 
invested a lot of time and 
resources into the high growth 
market. 
 
Ever since DNB, the number one bank 
in Norway, decided to join the battle of 
gaining market shares on the highly 
competitive Polish financial market, 
they have had many ups and downs. 
Today, the success is within reach. A 
recently published paper written by two 
master students from Lund University, 
have drilled deep down into the very 
heart of the MNC with branches all 
over the world, to find their key to 
success.  
 
- We got a golden opportunity, and 
were allowed to interview 25 
employees who are highly important 
within the organization. 
 
This is one of Astrid Lindesvärds 
commentary on the material for her 
and her partner, Sara Ahlberg’s, paper. 
We meet the two students in the 
Swedish student capital, Lund. The 
paper they published in May 2015 has 
been of great inspiration to many 
entrepreneurial minds who want to 
expand their business in the east of 
Europe.  
 
- The major result we found does not 
come as a surprise. An adaption into a 
new market and a new country with 
different culture does not take one day, 
it takes time, Sara Ahlberg states. 
 
 
The result of the study, that focused on 
the relationship between DNB’s 
Headquarter and its subsidiary in 
Poland, showed that above all, seven 
factors are important to take into 
consideration. These are information 
asymmetry, risk, control, organizational 
culture, trust, attention and path 
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dependency. These factors were in the 
paper applied to the agency theory, 
suggesting that the three factors trust, 
attention and path dependency were 
added to the narrow and the broad 
streams of agency theory that already 
exists.  
 
- By increasing the collaboration, 
communication and integration 
between the ventures, Astrid 
Lindesvärd mentions, we identified 
knowledge sharing as a vital resource 
within the organization, something that 
the Polish venture previously partly has 
been secluded from. The HQ has 
broad knowledge about the different 
industries that the bank focuses on, 
and this knowledge needs to be 
accessible for everyone.  
 
One of the most remarkable findings, 
was that path dependency, first 
thought to be a factor only partly 
affecting the relationship, was actually 
found to be affecting every single part 
of the relationship between subsidiary-
HQ, as well as the other factors 
studied. In the case of DNB’s 
subsidiary in Poland, the path 
dependency, or historical events that 
happened in the past still have an 
effect on the operations today. The 
subsidiary was established by a joint 
venture with a German bank. Initially 
the bank focused on corporate 
banking, but in 2007 it acquired a retail 
bank, turning into a universal bank. In 
2011 it was time for another 
restructuring, when the retail 
operations were sold off and 75 
percent of the workforce made 
redundant.  
 
- This is what the Polish venture has in 
its backback, and the effects are still 
visible until this day. Both positive 
aspects can be connected to what has 
happened in the past, such as having 
large flexibility today, but also negative. 
It was difficult to regain the trust of the 
employees and on the market  
after the time that followed the sales of 
the retail operations, Sara Ahlberg 
comments. 
”In some areas in 
Poland there are more 
retail bank offices than 
grocery stores ” 
 
 
Trust was one of the findings of the 
paper. Another finding was that 
organizational culture is of great 
significance, and that it is a matter of 
balancing the different cultures, both 
the business culture within the group, 
as well as the national cultures existing 
as an embedding blanket around the 
ventures. The master students found 
that whilst trying to create a mutual 
understanding for the differing 
business cultures, an expatriate who 
knew both cultures and could give the 
subsidiary a stronger voice towards the 
HQ was considered essential for 
enabling a future success. Another 
finding the paper made regarding 
embeddedness, is the contextual 
embeddedness. The Polish banking 
market is highly competitive, and it can 
be suggested to be the straight 
opposite of the Norwegian market. The 
CFO in DNB Poland argued that there 
are in some areas in Poland more 
retail bank offices than grocery stores. 
 
- The contextual embeddedness is 
truly an important aspect of a MNC. 
The market contexts and business 
cultures can differ across nations, and, 
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once again, it is most important with 
communication, personal contact and 
integration.  
 
Astrid Lindesvärd sums the results of 
the paper up. As stated, seven factors 
affect the relationship. DNB has been 
working with them all, proving that it is 
important to take social and contextual 
considerations seriously, when 
establishing a venture in a new 
country. DNB has integrated its Polish 
venture more to the DNB standards, 
the Scandinavian business culture and 
DNB atmosphere. The 
communicational exchange and the 
personal contacts, has increased. By 
building up a long-term relationship the 
trust and attention given to the 
subsidiary has clearly showed a 
decrease of the impact of the less 
fortunate backpack that the Polish 
venture carries.  
 
Today, the Polish venture is on the 
right track, competing against the top 
rated banks in Poland, and we thank 
the girls for sharing their findings. 	  
